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Introduction
A Pattern of Continuity
For the past few decades, Egyptian-American relations had been established on the
cornerstone that is the Camp David Accords. It codified a peace treaty between Israel and
Egypt, the first Arab country to recognize Israel’s existence officially. This Egyptian-American
relationship had started a long time after Nasser had broken ties with the Americans and
backed the Soviet Union. Since then, all Egyptian Presidents since Sadat’s peace negotiations
with Israel had maintained a steady relationship with the United States.
The United States maintained a consistent steady relationship with Egypt despite the
latter being under the leadership of autocratic authoritarian leaders. Whether it is Hosni
Mubarak’s over thirty years of authoritarian rule, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces’
iron-fist on anti-army protestors, Mohamed Morsi’s exclusion of political forces in Egyptian
governance, increased economic inequality, governmental regulations, authoritarian rule,
autocratic regimes, crackdown on dissenters and protestors, jail for political opponents, heavy
police activity that suffocated a lot of the political atmosphere in the country which limited
political participation in elections that have always been called into question, and other
examples of these “American values” being violated to name a few, the United States
maintained the same policy aims from its relationship with Egypt.
The research problem is that Egyptian regimes are projecting “anti-American values”
and still there was US continuity in foreign relations between Egypt and the United States. Even
when comparing two American Presidents from different political factions of the United States
political arena, Republican George Bush and Democrat Barack Obama, the resulting foreign
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policy always seem to carry the same core aim of stabilizing and securing US interests vis-à-vis
Egypt. The question here is why the US would support such regimes that were clearly against
what the US would regard as human rights, or American values, or dignified democratic ideals
that the world should abide by? The United States has long been an advocate for increased
democratic activity in the world and has numerously held the slogan of promoting democracy
for many of its wars, so why is Egypt different than Iraq? Why hasn’t the US relationship with
Egypt been affected much when it is clear that the Arab country is riddled and full of autocratic,
non-democratic mechanisms in its state apparatus? Why is there continuity in US-Egyptian
relations in that it doesn’t seem to be affected much by external or internal factors?
From examining the history, I will be showing that one can deduce that the AmericanEgyptian relationship is related to security of US interests above all else. It seems that values
and democratic ideals were not the guiding principles of the American relationship with Egypt.
It can be argued that strategic interests in Egypt and what the Arab country can provide in
terms of the security of what the US would be interested in in the Middle East is what the US
aims for in terms of its relationship with Egypt.
For that we need to elaborate more on US interests in the region in the first place. But
what is so important for the United States in the Middle East that requires it to go past its goals
from promotion of democracy and liberal ideals?

3

My answer is that the relationship between Egypt and America is a stable continuous
relationship because of two main reasons:
-

The American need to re-focus on growing challengers in the international arena
such as the rise of Chinese influence in Asia, the rise of Russia as a global power
player and the threat of terrorism.

-

The triumph of security of American interests in the Middle East over the projection
of US values in the region for the sake of stability.

To explore this hypothesis, I shall begin by expressing the foundations that I view as
essential for the Americans to have an interest in the Middle East in general and how important
Egypt is in particular and how the US managed to secure these interests vis-à-vis relationship
with Egypt. Secondly I will talk about the rise of the Chinese influence in Asia, especially in the
Northeast where the Koreas and Japan are and why the US needs to refocus its foreign policy
towards Asia.
The argument of the thesis is based on 2 levels of analysis: the international and the
individual. On an international level, the argument is that the pressures of the international
structure led the United States to naturally pursue a foreign policy that is more aligned with a
focus on a rising power in the structure in Asia. This is because the United States as a hegemon
in the international structure, the state does not want to consolidate power with any other
competition or rising power. Using elements of structural realism, and namely the theory of
Defensive Realism, I will argue that the United States was engaged in a structural pressure in
order to deal with its decline in influence in Asia which China has been exploiting for years in
order to further increase its own influence in the region. China is a rising power and Russia is a
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power player on the global stage, and the hegemon that is the United States needed to address
that in accordance with the thought of securing interests in the region, that is being a check on
Chinese and Russian influence to stop it from being a regional power. That means a refocus of
US foreign policy is needed towards China, since the majority of US foreign policy has targeted
resources of US power into forays of anti-terror operations, and democracy promotion in the
Middle East. Furthermore, a key structural influencer is elite perception, which is in the form of
the US President’s understanding and perception of the world around him.
On an individual level, Obama has expressed numerous times in his writings and in his
speeches, and in his actions that he acts in a way that the national interest of the United States
is what he cares about the most and several analysts and scholars have dubbed him to be a
man of realist tendencies and acts in a way a realist would agree with. His speeches about
foreign policy all were targeting a re-focus on the Asian continent and China, while stabilizing
the Middle East. These will be well documented and supported in the coming chapters.

Defensive Realism:
Examining the 2 major events of the past 4 years in Egyptian politics and the US reaction
to them shows the kind of reactionary but calculated decisions that were made in my view
point. The hypothesis of this thesis is that the decisions that were made were done in order to
maintain and sustain US-Egyptian relations under any circumstances without regards to the
type of rulers of Egypt who all have been labeled by numerous human rights organizations as
authoritarian, not completely democratic and not in line with what the US values represents as
it will be elaborated upon over the next coming chapters. Corruption, police brutality,
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oppression and aggressive treatment of demonstrations have been what Egypt is characterized
of the past few years. The Obama administration’s policy of not interfering with allies’ affairs –
especially Middle Eastern ones- and focus on Asia for the American foreign policy seem to make
the events in the Middle East a surprise for the American administration and it seemed to force
Obama to re-approach the matter of the Middle East with care. Yet indeed he still wanted to
have a shift towards Asia to deal with a rising China1. The administration sought stability in the
Middle East in general and Egypt in particular, without involving itself too much as the policy is
titled. That, in my argument, is the crux of defensive realism.
Defensive Neo-Realism is a structural theory in International Relations of the school of
thought that is Realism. Kenneth Waltz, an American political scientist who was a member of
the faculty at the University of California, Berkeley and Columbia University and one of the
most prominent scholars in the field of international relations, is considered to be a founder of
Defensive Realism in his work Theory of International Politics. The author argues in his book
that the anarchical structure of the international system encourages states to maintain
moderate and reserved policies in order to attain security.
As with all thought and assumptions that are basic in a Realist’s point of view, Defensive
Realism agrees with the assumptions that are outlined by neorealist scholar John Mearsheimer
in The False Promise of International Institutions which are2:
1.
2.
3.
4.
1

The international system is anarchic.
States possess the capabilities necessary to hurt and possibly destroy each other.
Basic goal and aim of states is survival.
States think strategically about how to survive in the international system.

MM, SD, BD, SL, MM, RR, BV. "Pivot to the Pacific: The Obama Administration's "Rebalancing" Toward Asia". Congressional
Research Service. 28th March 2012.
2 John J. Mearsheimer. “The False Promise of International Institutions” International Security 19:3. 1994-1995.
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5. States can never be certain about other states’ intentions.

These five assumptions are attained through the process of “self-help” and that anarchy in the
international system is what drives international politics.
Principle and power, morality and statecraft essentially do not mix. Hans J. Morgenthau
argues that there is a tension between moral command and requirements of successful political
action. That a state actor must think and act in terms of power3. Anarchy (the lack of a single
central government in the international system) means that in a political system, there is no
supreme power. Therefore states are constantly in a state of war: that is that the ultima ratio is
force. This does not however entail that states are on the brink of war, about to fight each
other with armed forces, but it qualifies the natural environment in which the international
system operates is in a heightened state of war because of the knowledge that force is the
ultimate arbitrator of disputes. Coupled with no supreme force, every country can only truly
rely on itself. An old British statesman perfectly illustrates the notion, Peter Palmerston once
said: “Great Britain has no permanent enemies or permanent friends, she has only permanent
interests”.
Unlike domestic politics, international politics has no central government. There is one
single overwhelming force that hangs around to officially be the world’s premier legislator or
policeman on which there is an official obligation to intervene in states’ affairs if they go awry
from international norms.
Anarchy allows states to be their own final judge of their interests, but requires that
each provide the means to attain them. Realism argues that a state’s primary goal is survival. To
3

Robert Art. Robert Jervis. “International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues”. Pearson Education Inc. 2007.
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achieve that co-operation in anarchy is difficult because states are often more concerned with
relative advantages rather than absolute gains, short-term objectives rather than long term
goals, immediate selfish benefits over overt general aims. There is a fear that others won’t live
up to their agreements.
In that light, defensive realists argue that the anarchic nature of the international
system encourages states to undertake defensive and moderate policies. States are not
intrinsically aggressive and that the “first concern of states is not to maximize power but to
maintain their position in the system”4. The argument here comes from the assertion that
states which strive to attain hegemony in the international system will be counterbalanced by
other states seeking to maintain the status-quo. Aggression is therefore argued to be selfdefeating in achieving the aim of security, the primary objective of states.
There is no mention of the concept of absolute gains in realist theory. It is a common
misconception about realism. The realities of the political scene and the theories of political
science are one of the reasons why a lot of neutral observers argue against political scientists
trying to explain structure and order of the international system and what should be done and
what shouldn’t be done, and this is a prime example. The reality is that a zero-sum world that
realistically is what a realist describes (consciously or unconsciously) when talking about the
international relations of states in the global political sphere. Saying anarchy is what is
overcasting its shadow over the international system (or rather there is nothing that is
overcasting its shadow on the international system) does not mean there is no international
structure. Because in assuming a state is a rational actor, then the concept of cost-benefit

4

Kenneth N. Waltz. “Theory of International Politics”. New York: McGraw Hill. 1979.
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analysis prevails in the decision-making process of the decision-maker of the state. A state does
not normally take a decision without taking into account its effects on the international system.
Why hasn’t China invaded Taiwan and asserted its territorial sovereignty as she claims Taiwan
to be part of it? Why hasn’t the US struck Iran already despite numerous calls from Israel to act
more directly with the Iran? A series of chain reactions could occur because every country
measures its place in the international structure according to the relative gains of each
transaction and interaction it embarks on. What leads to conflict or sources of friction is what
defensive realists assert that is elite perception.
Defensive realists assert that elite perceptions are key to the outbreak of conflict
between states. Elite perception is a structural modifier of the international system5. It can
upset the balance of power as elites –political leaders, de facto arbitrators of power- can inflate
threats in order to mobilize resources and promote expansion, or inhibit elites from recognizing
or rectifying their declining power in the international system. Although this example is usually
described when talking about rapidly expanding states in terms of territorial gains, it applies as
well on pursuing policies that are aggressive and expansionist in nature.
Kenneth Waltz also asserts that the international structure is defined by two things: the
ordering principle of the international structure that is anarchy and the distribution of
capabilities among states. Hence, the importance of the idea of power-balance in the structure.
The idea of balancing the status-quo by less powerful states is strong in its effects for
this sub-theory of neo-realism because it postulates that states which strive to attain hegemony
in the international system will be counterbalanced by other states seeking to maintain the

5

R.L. Schweller. “Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power”. Princeton University Press. 2006.
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status quo. It’s most relevant aspects in explaining the thesis’ research question lies in
correlation to the basic concept of the second-strike capability of a nuclear war. Defensive
realists assert that the second-strike capability afforded by a state’s nuclear arsenal inhibits the
ability of the aggressor state to strike another. Rather, it is better manifested in spirit in the
context of security dilemma. Security dilemma is when actions by a state intended to heighten
its security, such as increasing its military strength or making alliances, can lead other states to
respond with similar measures, producing increased tensions that create conflict, even when no
side really desires it.
Mearsheimer’s Aggressive policies, namely its most extreme –conquest, rarely outweigh
its negatives when compared to Walt’s defensive realism. Forcing policies that might not be
viewed as attaining maximum security for one state could push states further apart from each
other, increasing each other’s security dilemma.
Research Question
The main research question here is what is the possible explanation for the continuity of
the Egyptian-American relationship under Obama’s Presidency?
The keys to answer this main question lie in addressing the pressures that the United States
had to deal with in order to be able to address several concerns that are important to face as
the United States is arguably the most powerful state in the international structure, at least
enough to be considered a hegemonic power seeking to reduce the influence of other potential
hegemonic rivals since the Cold War.
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Hypothesis
From the available research, I will hypothesize that the US stance is that of maintaining
Egyptian-American relations in order to protect US Middle Eastern interests though stabilization
of the situation in that region in order to address growing concerns on an international level for
the United States. A normal continuation of the overall general aim of the USFP in the Middle
East.
The thesis will show that Obama’s post-revolution strategy was developed (and is
developing) according to events unfolding in Egypt on the ground. From that, we can extract
the explanation of why the US officially was “late” in expressing its support to the Egyptian
population gathering en masse in Egyptian squares.
The Russian annexation of Crimea in the midst of the Ukrainian crisis, while the continued
decline of US influence in Northeast Asia, the rise of China’s political and economic ties and the
increased threat of terrorism in the world has meant an increased systematic international
structure pressure on United States foreign policy. The resources and capabilities that are
available in the United States has been stretched and the United States sought stabilization in
the Middle East as a way to begin a grand strategy of refocusing foreign policy onto a rising
China primarily and to deal with the escalating situation in Ukraine as Russia increases its
influence in the Middle East via Syria and in Europe via Ukraine.
The decision to slash military aid to Egypt has created the potential for adverse
consequences for the Egyptian-American relations. Egypt and Russia are due to meet to sign
military contracts and if any military agreements are signed, it will be a change in the normal
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relationship between Cairo and Washington. It will hardly be an actual direct hit to American
interests in the region, but it will be categorized as threat.
In essence, neo-realism will be used to explain the nature of the relationship of the two
nations with Obama as President with a view that Stephen Walt’s defensive realism is what the
US had been using to develop its policies towards Egypt starting with the events of the January
Revolution as opposed to Mersheimer’s offensive realism.

Chapter Categorization:
In chapter one, I will be exploring the historical background of the relationship between
Egypt and the United States. This will help in the establishment of the foundations of the
Egyptian-American relationship to better understand the effects that had in the contemporary
politics of America and Egypt when it comes to securing US interests in the Middle East region.
In chapter two, I will be exploring the international structure pressures the United States is
under. The rise of China in Asia, the rise of Russia’s influence in Europe and Middle East and the
increased threat of terrorism have all had structural effects on the United States. Exploring each
situation’s effect on the relationship of Russia, China and the US will help elaborate more on
the kinds of international pressure the United States is having to deal with and how these
actions have led the United States to take on a more conservative take on the events of Egypt
in order to achieve the grand strategy aim of refocusing foreign policy on China.
In Chapter three, I mention the Arab Spring and the Egyptian coup. These two events
showcased the way the Unite States have reacted to the events on the ground in Egypt. By
characterizing the United States response and elaborating on its threats to US interests, I
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present an argument for why defensive realism is most appropriate explanation for the
understanding of these reactions, with a grand view on the grand strategy of the United States
to deal with international structural pressures.
In Chapter three, I discuss the issue of elite perception and how it is a structural modifier in
the defensive realism theory. From which I depart to discuss Obama’s perception of the world
and of US foreign policy which he analyzed in his book and his campaign for Presidency of the
United States.
In the last chapter, I will discuss how the cutting of aid was a mistake. It went against all
what a realist would recommend a foreign policy of the United States would be, and in such
empowered a challenger to US hegemony and gave it more influence in the region and
marginally declined the United States’. This in that sense helps confirm, or at least pushed the
argument towards defensive realism theory.

13

Chapter 1: History of US Interests in the Middle East
This chapter aims at giving background information about the US-Egyptian relationship,
and how it began after the rapprochement that happened in 1979 in the aftermath of the Yum
Kippur War of 1973. This is important because the Camp David Accords are essentially the
foundations of US interests in the Egypt and in the Middle East.
It also aims at giving the context in which Egyptian-American relations are set in when
Obama came to office in order to help manifest the situation Obama was in and how his
perception of the international structure pressures have been on him. Those latter points shall
be elaborated upon further in the coming chapters.
It provides an analysis of why the US wanted a strategic alliance with Egypt, and the
challenges of the Obama administration that was provided by the Bush legacy. This was
manifested further by Obama’s actions as President, but as I will later on explain to no avail
because of events in the Middle East. This is important given that the foreign policy objectives
of candidate Obama gave a big indication of a refocus on China and stability in the Middle East.

Background
The United States has long had interests in the Middle East, especially since the end of
World War II. An examination of the past few decades shows that one of the important points
is that the US has long been a constant export point for Arab oil. The dependence of the US on
Middle Eastern oil is one of the drivers for the Camp David Accords and the attempts for peace
in the region after the Yum Kippur War caused the oil embargo by Arab countries of their
Western customers. US Petroleum net imports from Saudi Arabia alone had reached 21% of
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total imports of the US, second behind Canada’s 42%6. Historically, the US had made a deal with
Saudi Arabia that enabled a “special” relationship with the Middle Eastern country. US
President Franklin D. Roosevelt met Saudi King Abd Al Aziz on board the USS Quincy in the
Great Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal in 1945, and both cemented a deal for securing oil resources
for the long-term7. In the aftermath of the WWII, the victorious US had established a position of
predominance in the Middle East with access to cheap oil in perpetuity in exchange for a
guarantee to maintain the rule of a single family on the largest country in the Arabian
Peninsula8. Additionally, the Israeli state had been established in 1948 with the Arab neighbors’
anger and fury. Israel had long been a US strategic importance due to historical and religious
reasons back home along with issues dealing with WWII and the holocaust caused by the Nazis
in Germany. The US had been an advocate of the Israeli state ever since it existed in 1948, and
maintained its support throughout the years. Bilateral relations have evolved from an initial US
policy of sympathy and support for the creation of a Jewish homeland in 1948 to an unusual
partnership that links a small but militarily powerful Israel, dependent on the United States for
its economic and military strength, with the American superpower trying to balance other
competing interests in the region. Others maintain that Israel is a strategic ally, and that US
relations with Israel strengthen the US presence in the Middle East9.

6

“How much petroleum does the United States import and from where?”. US Energy Information Administration. 4th December
2014.
7

Colin S Cavell. “America’s Dependency on Middle East Oil, Part II”. Global Research. 11th April 2012.
Colin S Cavell. “America’s Dependency on Middle East Oil, Part II”. Global Research. 11th April 2012.
9
Clyde R. Mark. ”Israeli-United States Relations”. Congressional Research Service. October 17, 2002.
8
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Securing Interest and Forming Allies:
Securing US interests over the years entitled creating alliances in the region. By the
1970’s, Israel had been through 2 wars with its Arab neighbors - including one in which it
controlled sovereign Arab territories it occupied in the 1967 Six Day War-, leaving a huge legacy
of discontent among the Arabs with relations to Israel, Saudi Arabia had established a monthslong oil embargo on the US for its efforts during the Yum Kippur War in 1973, Nasser had
already established socialism and backed the Soviet Union and the Middle East in general was
being a hot zone. All that was done in the midst of the Suez Canal being one of the most
important water passages in the world as it connected Asia with Europe, halving the route
around Africa through the Cape of Good Hope and having on average 2.4 million barrels of oil
passing through the canal each day, or around 2.5% of the world’s output along with the 2.5
million barrels the SuMed Piepline transports each day. 1973 presented an opportunity for the
US for seeking stability in the region.
In light with securing its interests in the region, and to understand the purpose of the
cornerstone of Egyptian-American relations, there is an identifiable need to examine the Camp
David Accords. The goals of the US to secure this relationship with Egypt can be traced back to
the Carter administration’s ambition to secure a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel after
the hostilities of 1973.
The Camp David Accords had been mediated by the US in a bid to secure its interests in
the Middle East region. Israel, as an important strategic partner to the US because of numerous
historical, political and religious reasons, has been a constant in declared US interests in the
region. It’s the one of the main reasons why Israel is the largest recipient of aid from the US.
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Strategists worried that continued turmoil would allow the Soviet Union to make
trouble with the West’s energy supplies. As a result, the US had a strategic interest in the
Middle East and securing peace between Egypt and Israel. Indeed, by securing the peace, Israel
was allowed to survive living among its neighbors that have been engaged in conflict with ever
since 1948 and in the future the treaty allowed Israel to “pursue aggressive policies without
having to worry about the Arab world’s largest military”10.
It had been argued at the time of the Carter administration that peace in the Middle
East would mean less turmoil in the mainland of the United States. American reliance on Arab
oil was a major factor to consider when dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict especially since
the global oil prices hiked as a result of the Arab oil embargo in the aftermath of the 1973 Yum
Kippur War. The American market was particularly hit due to the reliance and Washington had
been frightened by the 1973 war. In response to American aid to Israel during the war, on
October 16th, 1973, OPEC raised the posted price of oil by 70%, to $5.11 a barrel from around
$3. A cut in production by 5% from September's output and to continue to cut production in 5%
increments until their economic and political objectives were met11. Saudi Arabia and the other
Arab oil-producing states joined the embargo on October 20, 1973 which curbed exports to
various countries and blocked all oil deliveries to the US as it described the country as a
“principal hostile country"12. By March 1974, market prices rose from $3 per barrel to $12 per
barrel.

10

Scott McDonnell.” The history of the Camp David Accords reveals that even a sympathetic president could not stand up for
the Palestinians”. Mondoweiss.net. March 6th, 2011.
11 Daniel Yergin. ”The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power”. New York: Simon and Schuster. 2008.
12 George Lenczowski. “American Presidents and the Middle East”. Duke University Press. 1990.
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US interests were as follows:
1. Israeli security: Key to internal American politics.
2. Oil reserves security: Key to American economic interests.

If the goals of the United States from maintaining relations with Egypt are clear though,
why has the US expressed hesitance and caution from the events of January 2011 and June 30 th
2013 in

the Egyptian political scene? The responses to the Egyptian revolution of 25th of January

had been labeled “cautious”13, “hesitant”14, and even “suspicions”15 and that goes the same
with the June 30th protests16 17. Why has the US stopped and stuttered in supporting people’s
protests for more political inclusion, economic stability and growth, removal of corrupted
governmental officials and a better life in general?
In explaining the research problem that gives rise to the peculiarity of the thesis, we
need to set up the events that create the research problem. For that we need to describe the
initial Obama policies towards Egypt before the eruption of 25 th of January Revolution.

The Bush Legacy and Obama’s “Non-Intervention”
In 2009, Obama wanted to come to Egypt to address the Muslim world to announce a
new way of dealing with American interests while taking into account Muslim views, asserting
that the US is not at war with Islam and he chose Cairo University as his podium. The
administration first had to deal with the challenges of the Bush campaign in the Middle East
and the post 9/11 world which gave growing influences for anti-American groups in the Middle
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East, especially terrorist groups, while pushing for his own agenda for foreign policy which
would help the US better its image and work to advance policies towards Asia, specifically
China.
The negative remnants of the George W. Bush era made Obama’s campaign turn to
reversing those policies that Bush had advocated for, but the events in Egypt pulled Obama
back into the Middle East and become more involved in its politics than what he might have
campaigned for.
George W. Bush’s administrations (particularly in the second term of his Presidency)
created problems in the Middle East that were numerous and damaged the United States
position as the hegemon of the international system and affected the overall influence strength
of the country on top of the international structure. These policies characterized the United
States in the region as an arrogant superpower. The democracy promotion campaign was Bush
administration’s attempt to battle terrorism by spreading democracy in the Middle East, but it
only showed the level of hypocrisy between George Bush’s actions and his rhetoric, despite
accounts of George W. Bush genuinely believing that he can democratize the Muslim world but
he was met with laughter18.
An example comes from Egypt, where in 2004 and 2005 Bush had pushed for a
democratization effort in the country. Hosni Mubarak responded by allowing multi-candidate
elections for the office of President and holding a Presidential election and a relatively
reasonably free Parliamentary election with judicial supervision. The trouble is in the autocrats
of the ME, who helped blunt the implementation of these democratic efforts in an effort to
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please the United States with the look/illusion of free choice while still maintaining a grip on
power and not risk losing US support. In Egypt, the regime had made a law making it extremely
difficult for a candidate to credibly challenge Mubarak and shades were cast over the remaining
of the 2005 Parliamentary election rounds. The US had objected to these actions but at the
same time other interests in the region (Iraq and Palestine) were looming19.
Bush’s problems were:
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-

Half-hearted efforts to spread democracy in the region: These were situations like the
Egypt case in which the administration would push for democratic and liberal reforms to
the political and economic system of a state but because of interests more
important/urgent than the democracy programs the effort was cut short.

-

Guantanamo legal limbo and the lawful debate about the criminal pursuit and use of
torture against terror suspects: This presented a domestic issue that arguably was bigger
than the global issue with treating terror suspects and accordance to international law.
This only helped intensify the next point.

-

Unilateralism and tensions with allies: … around the world. Europeans and Middle
Eastern allies had become tense over a variety of issues pertaining to the Iraq War
particularly for the former, and the democratic program efforts particularly for the later.
Operation Iraqi Freedom included the US, UK and Australian militaries in its initial part.
Operation Desert Strom included the US and 9 other militaries, including Arab ones20.

-

The rise of Anti-American feelings: An accumulation of the previous points gives a
summation that has resulted in an increased antagonized response towards the US from
different groups in the ME, particularly the radical fundamentalists such as Hamas and
Hizb Allah who grew in terms of influence by portraying the actions that the US have
made as anti-Islamic and a war against Muslims in the ME rather than the US just having
a war in the ME21, which in of itself is a compelling argument.
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From a realist perspective, Bush had failed to identify the key ways in which he would
use American power in order to secure his homeland and the United States interests in the
Middle East as the end product of his policies only put more danger to American interests. In a
2002 survey by Pew, between 40-60% of non-Americans around the world think the United
States is waging war on terrorism not just for security concerns, but also for “oil”, “protect
Israel”, “target Muslim governments” “or “dominate the world”22. The image of the US is also
bleak in the Arab world as fewer than 10% of people surveyed by Zohby International Poll in
2004 in Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Morocco, and Jordan
approved US policy on Arabs, Iraq and Palestine. Pew reported that in one survey of Muslim
countries, population expressed their concerns that US military power may ultimately target
them. If the United States is a force of good, then why do even its allies have concerns about its
influence?
George W. Bush’s main problem, and challenge to Obama was in his approach to
democratize the Middle East with his unilateral decision to attack Afghanistan and particularly
Iraq. The later campaign under the name of Operation Iraqi Freedom was particularly criticized
for being anywhere from illegal to unneeded depending on your point of view. The war was
conducted with little co-operation with the international community as the US had moved its
troops despite international observers not providing any evidence for the presence of weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq as previously claimed by the US administration and absence of a UN
Security Council resolution approving the assault on Iraqi soil prior to the entrance of the US
troops in Iraq. Bush had embraced unilateralism with open arms.
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To help remedy the problems of the Bush reign, the objectives of the foreign policy of the
United States under Obama in the Middle East23: (no particular order)
123456-

Broad co-operation with Israel and commitment to its security.
Achievement of Palestine’s aspirations for statehood.
Unity and Security of Iraq.
Non-proliferation and counter terrorism co-operation.
Access to energy reserves.
Integration of region into the global market.

The Obama administration’s foreign policy goals in the Middle East focused on strengthening
US-ME countries’ alliances, nuclear proliferation to ensure the protection of US interests in the
region were built on the belief/assumption that the autocratic governments are stable enough
not to risk losing their alliance by promoting democracy too much in their countries. Contrary
to the policies of his predecessor, Obama’s administration had not been too pushy for change
in his allies in the Middle East –or around the world for that matter-, adopting what is called a
“subtle none-interventionist approach”
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towards promoting democracy. While the

aggressiveness of Bush’s policy and his military efforts in the Middle East had resulted in two
major wars and countless military and civilian casualties that helped tarnish the Americans'
image and stature in the Middle East and the world, and did not help promote American
interests but rather risked US interests. This approach had to be dialed down after Bush, but it
was soon to be rendered implausible as the Arab Spring forced him to bring democracy
promotion on top of USFP agenda again.
At the end of the Bush administration’s time, countries –including allies- realized vividly
that The United States’ power could threaten their own interest. This realization was
23
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particularly because of Bush’s aggressive policies which forced smaller, less powerful countries
to view the United States in a more negative light as the smaller countries looked to give more
security to their interests which they feared can be trembled upon by the power of the
hegemon in the international structure. As Stephen Walt said once “ Even those… that do not
fear a US attack are still aware that the United States’ position as the world’s lone superpower
makes it easier for Washington to get its way”25. Other states are wary, or at least have
become so.
The goals of George Bush, Barack Obama and Jimmy Carter are all similar to one
another when it comes to the region in general and Egypt in particular. Despite differences in
Presidents, the US’s interests stayed the same and relations with Egypt were maintained
despite Egypt going through its own version of the democratic process in action. The
protection of Israel, the security of oil reserves and transport and nuclear non-proliferation are
key recurring elements in the Egyptian-American relationship.
The American-Egyptian relations can be explained in terms of its continuity. Despite
various rulers, many of whom are violators of US values, but not US interests, the US has
provided significant military and economic assistance to Egypt since the late 1970’s with the
conclusion of the Camp David Accords. Middle Eastern Affairs specialist in the US Congressional
Research Services group Jeremy Sharp says that US policy makers routinely justify Egypt’s
enormous $1.3 billion aid as an “investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running
cooperation with the Egyptian military and on sustaining the [peace] treaty with Israel” as the
Egyptian government has been “generally influencing developments in the Middle East in line
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with US interests”26. Indeed he acknowledges that the current Egypt military-back government
assembled by former Defense Minister and current Egyptian President Abd El Fatah El Sisi has
been attempting to establish political order that “some describe as a partial revival of
authoritarian rule”, but that the interim government has restored a modicum of order with the
exception of violence and disorder persisting in the Sinai Peninsula and some areas of mainland
Egypt. However, he also describes that numerous US officials see Egypt as an “anchor state” in
the words of US Central Command, part of the US military’s command posts. Moreover,
numerous US allies have sought greater US support for the Egyptian government, including
Israel and the Gulf states to fight the Islamists attacks in the Sinai and continuing to combat the
Muslim Brotherhood.
The United States saw the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat before the results of the
Parliamentary and Presidential elections of 2012. The MB were seen as a threat being an
Islamist organization, and yet when they came to power democratically in Egypt they were not
attacked, Egypt was not sanctioned and the US was not hostile to the reality of the situation.
Seeing the MB who were directly hostile to the West in general ever since their 80 years of
existence and the US and Israel in particular the last few decades in official and unofficial
political opposition places in the Egyptian political sphere (particularly the Camp David
Accords), and yet when they became official holders of power in Egypt they arguably did not
perform any hostile acts towards the US or Israel and even reassured the world that they will be
upholding the Camp David Accords which were hated by the Brotherhood when they were not
in power. Contradictions to observers, but sensible decisions as seen by realists in general.
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The argument here is that for the US to maintain its interests, for instance, the
diplomatic influence of Egypt in the region for peace, it needed to work with a perceived hostile
organization. The MB in government, to guarantee its own survival in power, kept the status
quo (at least for the short-term future) in order to maximize on their electoral victory.
The uprisings in Egypt presented a challenge to the United States’ policy and his
approach of implementation. The events tested the US’ ability to cope with immediate events
that could potentially have an altering effect on foreign policy for the foreseeable future
regarding security in the region along with the security of interests of the US giving Obama his
first major Middle Eastern problem to cope with. The US was in a situation of having “to choose
friends and make enemies as a result”27.
More importantly, it presented Obama with an obstacle to his foreign policy goals, the
main being refocus on China’s growing influence. The stability in the Middle East can achieve its
purpose by having a stable Egypt, which is the main reason why the US sought Egypt as a
strategic ally. If Egypt is unstable, the security of US interests is not stable to a large degree.
China’s military might, economic growth and interdependency in Asian countries and flexing its
diplomatic muscles will make the Chinese influence harder to contain if the United States does
not do something about it and for that it needs to stabilize the Egyptian situation.

Conclusion:
The United States established relations with Egypt in the aftermath of 1973 with
intention of security. Israel and oil have been the defining features of the relationship the US
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has enjoyed with the Middle East and Egypt was identified to be its insurer. With Egypt
strapped up in a peace deal with Israel, it was a complete stability pact for the region as the
Arab world’s most influential military power became tied politically to the Israeli state. The
Israeli state’s security was given an extra guarantee above US protection as the threat of Egypt
entering a war with Israel diminished significantly with the Accords.
The terms and motivations for the deal defined the goals of the United States in having
relations with Egypt after years of dispute. It established what the US wanted from Egypt and
given context to the relationship between the two countries for our contemporary politics.
The Bush and Obama policies attempted at stabilizing the issues concerning US security
in different ways, but all ended up with the same result. The continuation of US foreign policy
towards Egypt is marked by the continuation of military and economic aid to Egypt, with
increased cooperation between Egypt’s military and the American military on counter terrorism
and intelligence sharing. The Suez Canal continued to provide preferential treatment to US
Navy vessels and the airspace was open for intrusion from the American warplanes.
The rise of anti-American feelings in the region though is significant. The appearance of
the Muslim Brotherhood is of the utmost importance because of their role in the consequent
January and June uprisings when they were both in power and out of power. The threat of an
Islamist organization ruling a US ally is of utmost importance in our discussion, because even
when they were in power, US foreign policy kept the same result going on and on. Aid resumed,
support resumed and Egypt kept fulfilling its roles as US insurer of US interests in the region.
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Chapter 2: The Need to Refocus on International Pressure Challenges
This chapter discusses two main topics: the rise of China in the Northeast Asian region
and highlighting the decline in US hegemony in that region, and the rise of Russian influence in
the Middle East and Europe via Syria and Ukraine.
The first part of the chapter focuses on the ways China is gaining influence in the region,
while also reconciling with the fact that it is on a way of collision of interests with the US,
something that US policymakers are starting to notice and react.
The second part focuses on the rise of Russian influence. The US has been engaged in a
diplomatic and political struggle in order to be able to maintain the security of its allies in
Europe and to maintain its image of protector against the proliferation and use of weapons of
mass destruction. The Ukrainian and Syrian cases are of interests here since Russia had annexed
Crimea from the Ukraine and Syrian forces –or Syrian rebels- have used Sarin gas in an attack
that left hundreds of civilians dead despite the United States issuing a “red line” warning
against the use of such weapons in Syria.
This is important to explain how the United States wants to maintain hegemony around
the world and on the international structure, and how it is dealing with the increasing pressures
of the structure.
American Influence in Asia
The United States had dominated for decades after WWII the Northeast Asian region of
the globe. It gained its support there with trade, aid and military assurances. In his article, “The
United States and East Asia: The Decline of Long-Distance Leadership”, Mark Beeson, Professor
of International Politics at the University of Western Australia, argues that the US played an
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extremely huge role in determining the consequences of WWII on Asian politics. Citing
America’s position coming out of the war as the biggest military in the world and with the
largest most dynamic economy, he argues that it would play “a major role in determining the
shape of the emerging international economic order”. He noted that we as observers need to
understand the importance of “recogniz[ing] the pervasive, enduring nature of its [America]
influence” namely through “intitutionaliz[ing] an international order that reflected and
enhanced its dominance or turn structural potential into political agency”28. The military power
of the US had been demonstrated by its ability to conquer the Imperial Japanese forces during
the war and the subsequent occupation of Japan. US hegemony was expressed via the degree
of consent that Japan, and other Asian countries, expressed after the war by bandwaggoning
with their support of American policies. As for economic dominance in the world, in 1953 the
US accounted for 45% of the global manufacturing output, GDP was almost at $400 billion, one
of the highest in the world, at least enough to help fund the reconstruction of Europe via the
Marshall Plan.
The dominance of American politics in the region can be attributed to two things: Firstly,
the multilateral institutional order associated with the Bretton Woods regime –which would
later be known as the World Bank and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade held out the
prospect of integration into what would eventually prove to be a highly effective and
expansionary economic order which gave incentives to join the US side, the Asian developing
countries would then be able to access the world’s largest market and on favorable terms,
working for their interests. Secondly is the American-centric security architecture done through
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a series of bi-laterals. The US had been involved form the start by interventionist policies with
an interventionist role in shaping Northeast Asia. This was most manifested in the role the US
played in the reconstruction of Japan which helped Japan become a pivotal country in the
politics of the region while still maintaining dependency and subordinate to the US, effectively
preventing it from assuming or exercising regional leadership roles despite its economic rise.
Why is the United States involved in such relations in Northeast Asia? What are the
reasons for the United States wanting to have an influence in the region while stifling the rise of
any other regional power in Asia that would challenge US’ influence?

Hegemony Projection and China’s Rise
According to defensive realist assessment, the contest for power in the globe is the
driving force of international relations as a whole. Under that note, the United States needed to
stifle any rising power in any specific region because it wanted to assert its hegemony and
influence over the international structure, and that means containing any new challengers to US
influence in any region around the world. The survival of a state in the international order is the
most important goal, and a state cannot pursue any other goal if it does not survive. As earlier
discussed, the international structure has three main characteristics; the world is in anarchy
where there is no one defined world government with authority, states have the capabilities to
hurt one another, and no one state can know the intentions of another. It is impossible to know
whether Germany, Japan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, South Africa will act in a certain way in 2025.
The structure itself forces states to be concerned about its own security because it
cannot gauge the intentions of another state involved in actions that would increase its ability
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to gain more power in the international order. States tend to fear each other. The fear is
compounded because there is no higher authority that would guarantee the safety of states,
and as such the best response for them is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential
rivals. Canada and Mexico will not attack the United States anytime soon because neither of
those countries have the capability to dominate the United States in war. Great powers strive
to be a hegemon in the international order.
It is however impossible to be a global hegemon29. According to Walt and Mearsheimer,
to be able to be one is to exert so much pressure, and to project and sustain so much power
around the globe and onto the territory of other distant powers that is almost impossible to be
practical. In that light, states that gain regional hegemony have a further aim: they seek to
prevent great powers in other regions from duplicating their feat. They want to keep other
regions divided among several powers so that these states will be in eventual competition with
each other that they cannot focus on challenging other powers in the international structure.
A great power’s work is not done when it achieves regional hegemony. When the United
States achieved enough power to practically declare the Western Hemisphere out of reach for
European powers, it started the twentieth century with tasks to contain four rivals for their own
regions’ hegemony: Imperial Germany (1900-1918), Nazi Germany (1933-1945), Imperial Japan
(1931-1945) and the Soviet Union (1945-1989). The United States entered WWI when Imperial
Germany looked like it would win the war and rule Europe. In 1940, Roosevelt went to great
lengths to make the US enter the war when Japan’s ambitions were becoming bigger and Nazi
Germany making huge gains in Europe. After 1945, the United States worked on preventing the
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Soviets from increasing their influence globally, and hence the policy of containment was the
hallmark of the early Cold War American foreign policy. In 1992, the results of the policies of
the United States was highlighted in the results of the “Defense Guidance” which boldly stated
that the United States would not tolerate a peer competitor as it declared that the United
States was now the most powerful state in the world. This was echoed in Bush 2002’s National
Security Strategy asserted that the United States should check rising powers.

Rise of China and Decline of the US
China will seek to maximize the power gap between itself and its neighbor so powerful
that no state in Asia has the guts to threaten it. It is more likely that China will want to dictate
the boundaries of acceptable behavior acceptable behavior to neighboring countries, much the
way the US has been doing regionally and globally. An increasingly powerful China is also likely
to try to push American influence out of Asia. Indeed, much of the Chinese people will
remember what happened when Japan was powerful and China was weak. The military
cooperation between Japan and Korea with America will surely been seen as an increasing
threat to Chinese interests and as China grows, it will seek that alliance be mitigated.
China is already building an impressive threat to US influence and power projection in
the region. China had been one of the fastest growing economies in the world, with a huge
manufacturing base. China’s economic rise means that an important lever of US influence in the
Northeast Asia region has been “greatly weakened” 30 and that Washington DC cannot rely on
its economic muscle as much anymore to persuade Asian allies to embrace American policies.
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In 2007, China’s trade with Japan surpassed that of the American one and earlier in 2004, China
replaced America in being Seoul’s largest trading partner.
In terms of military security and power projection, the Chinese armed forces active
personnel numbered around 2,285,000 people, with around 1,000,000 people in reserves, with
over 300,000,000 people fit for military service available to be called when absolutely needed.
Recently, the army, air force, navy and artillery have undergone huge upgrades and have been
equipped with new weapons of considerable capabilities. The air force has over 2000 aircraft,
with around 1500 fighters such as the advanced Su-27 and brand new Russian Su-30 plus their
Chinese equivalents and fighter bombers and between 70-90 H-6 strategic bombers, with plans
to modernize the fleet in the coming decade aimed at power projection. In the navy, the
Chinese government is on course to develop a blue water navy to challenge the lonely US Navy
in that aspect, and it is a vital military endeavor in order to project power on a global scale a key
sign of growing influence or rise of a power. Only the US manages to do so with incredible
effect on a grand scale. Already, the Chinese government had commissioned its first ever
Aircraft carrier the Liaoning, with plans to at least build one more supercarrier which will be
nuclear-powered31, and has plans to build dozens of nuclear-powered attack and strategic
submarines. As for the missile program, the Chinese military can call upon numerous types of
intercontinental ballistic missiles, one of the few countries that can afford such a military luxury
other than France, the United Kingdom, Russia and America. Additionally, the Chinese
government is engaging in an anti-satellite program, with plans to fill the upper atmosphere
with a number of spy satellites and developing anti-satellite missiles.
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This will upset the balance of power in the Northeast region of Asia, with China rising
and the other powers seeking to balance that rise with increased security policies no doubt. The
problem is that these countries relied so heavily on the United States because of the United
States influence on them –as previously mentioned- since the end of WWII in particular and in
the past in general. And, the United States influence has been declining steadily over the past
decade in particular.
The Americans have lost first place in being the leading trading partner with Korea and
Japan to China as already discussed, and that is only a culmination of a series of policies that
have given way to a rise of Chinese influence in the region.
Additionally, the United States military presence in Korea and Japan has been
decreasing steadily. By the end of the first decade of the 21 st Century, American forces in Japan
decreased by around 8000 soldiers to around 40,000 and in Korea from 39,000 in the 1990’s till
25,000. Although there is an argument for the use of better military technology that will be
more efficient and effective with less troops, it is still a sign of potential decline to the casual
observer in military stance. The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan also have had their toll on
the US military in terms of budget, spending loss of personnel in an all-volunteer army at a time
of economic recession on a global stage in 2008.
It is argued within some political science circles that the decline started showing in the
American reaction to the Asian financial crisis in the 1990’s when the crisis proved to Asian
countries how vulnerable they are. It was clear that that the region was heavily reliant on
external countries for assistance and that the region had “little indigenous capacity to deal with
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such crises” with hardly an effective leader amongst them32. China was the only country
arguably to emerge from the crisis with its position improved, at least relative to all others. It
evolved its role to become a participant in multilateral forums such as the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization and ASEAN +3, while the United States had started its own evolution
into a unilateral beast.
Under Bush and Cheney, in the wake of September 11 th, 2001, the United States foreign
policy became so focused on security that it began to undermining to arguably the foundations
of the most distinctive and enduring aspect of American hegemony and leadership the United
States would like to portray itself in for the past decade post Cold War, multilateral
institutionalization33. The responses and attitudes turned towards the negative and the US
became more questioned than before.

The United States’ Need to React to China
In terms of the international level of analysis, a growing rising power will almost
certainly be checked by the more powerful state in the structure, especially true for a so-called
hegemon. If not, then the challenging state is providing an incredible security risk to the more
powerful one and as such committing such a mistake gravely endangers a state’s ultimate goal
of survival in the world.
Accordingly, the assumption is that America wants to be the only hegemon in the world,
at least not allow any other power to become as regionally influencing as itself is on the
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Western hemisphere, unless checked by the United States itself. Similarly, an increasingly
powerful China will not tolerate US influence in its region and will kick out the US from Asia
much as the US managed to do with European powers from the Western Hemisphere.
These policies make good sound strategic sense for China. When Japan was stronger
than China during the former’s Imperial period, the Chinese people suffered from war crimes
and rape by their Japanese conquesters and it still is a vivid painful moment that the both
nations share as evident by the fight over the sovereignty of a group of small islands called
Senkaku Islands, which is surrounded by oil reserves. It is better for China then to be string,
rather than being weak. Professor Mearsheimer notes also that “Why would a powerful China
accept US military forces operating in its backyard?”. On the opposite end, historically, the US
has never accepted or tolerates a peer competitor to its hegemony. America is likely to behave
in a fashion similar to what it did with the Soviet Union.
The ultimate aim of any states is survival, and the security of such a goal in an anarchical
world is security of that goal by securing interests that directly lead to such a goal. The more a
state gains a capability to harm another state, it increases the chances that can hurt another
state and as such other states are required to gain an upper hand relative to that rising power,
or else risk its own security.
If unchecked, the United States influence in the region can be comprised and then the
Chinese government will be able to expand its power to a global stage, as once a state reached
regional hegemony, it is entailed to check other powers from rising in other regions in the
world, much as the United States is trying to do for the years since the end of WWII.
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The whole situation was analyzed in a well thought manner by the Australian
government’s Defense White Paper 2009. It postulates that the Asia-Pacific region will endure
an order that will transform the distribution of strategic power of the region 34. The argument in
the paper is that China is having a significant effect on the global balance of power, arguing that
the power gap between China the US is shrinking and that any primary influence the US has
over the Asian region will likely to decline relative to China’s increased influence.
States can never be sure of each other’s intentions. For example, Imperial Germany is
still intensely debated amongst political scientists if it was a highly aggressive state that
pursued aggressive policies that led to the eruption of the First World War, or whether Nasser
was aggressive in his handling of the policies he pursued that led Israel to “pre-emptively” strike
first in concern with its national security and survival and occupied Sinai from Egypt. The root of
the problem is that unlike tangible issues, intentions are not quantifiable, and as such difficult
to verify.
In terms of military capabilities, which can be quantifiably verified, it is hard to assume
they are defensive or offensive capabilities. The Israelis, the Americans and the Chinese all
claim their armed forces to be defensive forces acting when the security of their respective
states is risked. In 1932 Disarmament Conference, the participants found themselves unable to
draw a line between what military equipment constituted defensive or offensive capabilities as
much of the military’s equipment can have both. The capabilities that get developed to defend
have enormous potential to be offensive weapons.
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Like

the Americans, the Chinese –as previously discussed- are employing a large

amounts of power projection capabilities such as nuclear submarines and nuclear aircraft
carriers along with a blue water navy. According to Robert Kaplan in an article in Foreign Affairs
“China’s naval leaders are displaying the aggressive philosophy of ... US naval strategist Alfred
Thayer Mahan who argued for sea control”35; which is bound -along with the fact that states
can’t verify other states intentions- to cause concern with China’s neighbors and the US by
risking American influence in the region and as such the security of its interests.

The United States’ Impression in China
There is obviously no way China’s leaders know who will be in charge of the United
States in the future, much less their intentions, but they know that the highest possibility is that
like a majority of US Presidents have said, they want to secure US power world-wide. This
means that the US might not want to allow China to rise as a regional power. The US spends as
much as the next 15 states that come after her in terms of military spending, or spending on
defense, and is designed to fight around the world. In addition, the Asia-Pacific region contains
military presence in a lot of bases surrounding China. Anyone in China assessing the Americans
is likely to see the US as an aggressive state that is trying to interfere with Chinese power and
influence and therefore national security. It can even see the US as a war-like country and is
therefore dangerous. After all, America has been at war for 14 of the 21 years since the Cold

35

Robert Kaplan. “ The Geography of Chinese Power”. Foreign Affairs. 2010.

37

War ended36 and historically, the Chinese and the Americans fought each other in the Korean
War in the 1950s. The recent talk about war with Iran does not help.
This tells us that the future of security in the region will revolve around China and the
United States, both power seeking hegemony at least in the region, with significant offensive
capabilities and unknowable intentions. The concept of anarchy sets in to ensure on every
country to ensure its own survival.

Rise of Russian Influence in the International Structure
After World War II, the United States found itself as the most powerful military in the
world with one of the most stable economies in the world. For that, the Soviet Union was
second best and aimed at limiting US’ ability.
Joseph Stalin came out of WWII with the aim of “deter[ing] the US from utilizing its
military strength” and he did so by capitalizing on his big army and utilizing the fear of Western
Europe of being vulnerable to attack from his Red Army37. His policies helped the USSR become
an industrial and military superpower, but ultimately wreaked havoc on the domestic scene,
with millions of deaths in the Soviet population.
Nikita Khrushchev guided the USSR towards improving areas of cooperation between
the USSR and its republics in areas of conflict. He struck fear with the Cuban Missile Crisis and
the construction of the Berlin Wall which both helped increase and highlight the Soviet’s
hegemonic power. He also viewed the “Third-World” as an arena where the Soviets could
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compete with the West instead of the big arena that is the direct conflict between the
superpowers. This entry to other states allowed for increased trade and influence38.
Going through Gorbachev and Yeltsin, those characterized the relationship of the
Soviets with the West in a more diluted way than their predecessors. Both aimed at more
peaceful policies towards the West by aiming at decreased confrontation, although Gorbachev
went as far as compelling the West to seek new policies and rethink in new terms, the Yeltsin
administration failed to understand new international realities39.
When it comes to Putin, the Russian rise in influence came to an important chapter.
Putin made Russia the influential power player it is now, capitalizing on historical records that
show Russia’s intent on being a global player, because Putin put Russia’s foreign policy
decisions based on the best interest of his nation, security and survival in the mist of continued
US global power projection. Putin went to forge new relationships with strategic partnerships
such as a visit to North Korea and to Fidel Castro’s Cuba in late 2000, part of his attempt at
challenging US hegemony. Aiming at increasing the pressure on Islamist fundamentalism which
Russia has been dealing with in Chechnya for decades, Putin was one of the first heads of state
to offer George Bush support in the aftermath of 9/11, but that to live shortly due to the Iraq
War. Russia developed relationships with Iran while maintaining their strategic alliance to the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Russia is not interested in a nuclear Iran, but has sought
to challenge the US that is trying to deal with Iran that is developing a nuclear program by
offering to build Iran a number of nuclear plants.
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Again, by using the elements of structural realism, the same elements and tenants used
to analyze the rise of China previously, it is clear that Russia is acting in its own self-interest.
Russia does not seem to desire to reside on the sidelines on the international order as evident
by its actions. This can be also manifested by its capabilities, namely its oil power in Europe, and
its growing military capabilities.
Russia is the eleventh largest exporter of oil to the United States and US allies in
Western Europe rely heavily on Russian oil and gas. If Russia chooses to cut off these supplies to
Europe, it will greatly affect Germany, Ukraine and France in particular. It is critical to ensure
that Russia does not withhold these resources according to US and European interests.
Additionally, the United States would operate in a less efficient manner if Middle Eastern
countries, or other oil suppliers such as Venezuela, are affected by Russian decisions and
influences into reducing supplies to the United States. The history of 1973 is very clear in that
regard.
Militarily, the Russians are growing. Aircraft carriers are in the plans of the future
Russian Navy, while the nuclear submarine force is being renovated and some have replaced by
brand new Borei-class submarines. In total, the Russian Navy has around 50 submarines, 1
aircraft carrier with plans to build brand new amphibious assault ships, landing craft and
expanding the type of power projection capabilities of the navy to become a true blue water
navy to rival the US dominance of the seas. The ballistic missile program is still up and running
and causing direct concerns to the Swedish and Norwegians as evident by the “Blue Spiral” of
200 and “Swedish hunt for the Russian ghost submarine” in 2014. The Russian Air Force is
developing and purchasing brand new fighters and fighter bombers in the form of the highly

40

acrobatic and capable Su-35 and Su-34s while developing a new version of the famous Mig-29
to be named the MiG-35, while maintain its fleet of high-altitude interceptors MiG-31s. The
strategic bombers are still in active service and capable to deliver nuclear missiles and bombs.
All in all, the country is still developing power projection capabilities for the future with aircraft
tankers ordered to increase the range of the Russian Air Force. As of today, the Russians have
been constantly harassing the European allies of the United States and the United States itself
by flying formations of fighters, fighter bombers and bombers on the shorelines of these
countries testing the response time of American and European fighter planes. The Russian
planes are sometimes armed and sometimes display aggressive maneuvers and are seen as
“testing” the other states’ air force capabilities.
This does not mean that the US is not to blame for the deterioration of US-Russian
relations. From Russia’s perspective, the US appears expansionary as it had built a coalition
with countries in Eastern Europe that used to be in the Soviet Union, that Russia had influence
over more than it comparably does now. From a Hobbesian point of view, Russia considers the
US as a threat to its own autonomy and Russia accordingly will do what it can to fight and resist
this American influence. This is especially important given the expansion of the European Union
member states to include former Soviet republics and the NATO expansion to include former
Soviet satellites, namely those sharing Russian borders like Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, all of
which are now having NATO fighter jets circling the air near the Russian borders on patrol. A
massive irritant for the Russian, and of course a source of security concern.
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Crimea and Syria Raise Russia’s Profile as a Global Player
Crimea and Ukraine in general has been seen as strategic partner to Russia’s foreign
policy advisors. Ukraine was part of the old Soviet empire and was in Russia sphere of influence,
at least it was always being fought over in elections as the dominant domestic Ukrainian politics
was a fight between Ukrainian nationals and Ukrainians of Russian decent. In the East of
Ukraine and in Crimea, a large percentage of the population there are of Russian decent. With
the size of the Russian population, and the presence of Russia’s only warm water seaport in
Crimea, Sevastopol, both those region, especially the Crimean Peninsula, are of utmost
strategic importance to the Russian government.
When the events of Ukraine started, the Russians were quick to give the ousted
Ukrainian President Yanukovych a place to stay and the rebels fighting against the Ukrainian
forces in Crimea and the Eastern front were supported by Russian supplies and were seen flying
the Russian flag. Indeed, in Crimea, the Russian government worked very hard to be able to
give itself legitimacy. It witnessed the Crimean Parliament give a referendum option for the
population of the Peninsula on whether to join Russia or not, which passed with incredible
approval ratings. The Russian government moved forces and raised its flag, and annexed Crimea
from the Ukrainian state. A direct assault and confrontation with US allies in the region.
The rise of Russian influence also manifests itself in the power Putin has when it comes
to dealing with President Bashar Al Asad of Syria. The Syrian Civil War has been around since
2012 and the factions have been engaged in extreme conflict and assault, violating numerous
human rights clauses and potentially committing war crimes. The belligerents of the conflict
have been numerous, Iran, Hizb Allah, Syrian regular army, Al Qaeda, ISIS and numerous other
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factions are at war which makes the mediation efforts almost entirely inept. The United States
have tries for a long time to lessen the effects of the war and trying to brokerage a peace deal
but the presence of the United States is actually a hindrance since a lot of the terrorist
organizations that are at work in the Syrian crisis are actually formed partially because of the US
hegemonic presence in the Middle East. The Russians have a vested interest as well but
because they have not had an influential presence since the end of the Cold War. The warm
water port of Tartu’s is the only Middle Eastern presence of the Russian Navy in that region and
in light of Russia’s foreign policy is aimed at increasing its influence globally and countering US
influence in the region around Russia, it is important for Russia to secure its interests. The
relationship between Syria and Russia has been ongoing, Russia has been supplying the Syrians
with Surface-to-Air missiles and air force fighter jets.
With the United States’ image and rhetoric not heard or respected by most of the
factions of the war, Russia is enjoying some influence with regards to the Syrian President and
the Iranians. The Russians have more relative influence than the Americans in all cases and
arguments.
Terrorism’s Effect on the International Hegemon
To be able to talk about terrorism and its effects in the international order, we need to
establish what it is. According to Hartmut Behr, Political Science Professor in the University of
Newcastle upon Tyne, he describes the characteristics of transnational terrorism by:
-

Trans-border coordination of attacks.
Erection of an internationally networked infrastructure.
International fundraising and financing.
International trade in weapons.
Recruitment and training of terrorists on a global scale.
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The way the terrorist organisations that have emerged to strike the Western states’
security is mostly based upon Middle Eastern policies of the United States and its allies in the
region which are viewed as anti-Islamic and anti-Arab and anti-Middle Eastern in its effects and
nature. The role of the US is one of the cases of the creation and evolution of groups such as Al
Qaeda and ISIS. Returning to foundations of the relationship with Egypt, the rise of antiAmerican feelings is directly related to the political stances of the US in favor of Israel, which
the terrorist organization see in a dim light given that Israel has been occupying Palestinian
territories, at least since the 1967 Un Resoultion 242. The Americans also support Israel
financially and militarily.
The American projection of power and presence is also fueled by support for the Middle
Eastern autocratic authoritarian regimes. It is argued that these corrupt, undemocratic,
oppressive regimes such as the ones in Egypt, have squandered the resources of the region and
are responsible for the poverty that ensued. The United States is seen as a supporter of that.
This anti-American feelings are exploited for recruitment purposes in the terrorist cells in the
Middle East.
The foundation of the structure of the conflct that terrorism have erected can be
explained in terms of the opolitical and military involvement of the United States in the region
in America’s efforts to secure its own interests in the region, indeed numerous Arab leaders are
seen as puppets serving the Americans’ interests in the region above the interests of the
oppressed population.
The United States acknowledges terrorism as a threat to its global hegemony. The
National Security Strategy of 2002 refers to international terrorism and says that the US “Will
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not hesitate to act alone, if nessesary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting
preemptively against such terrorists”, thus the decision was made to use the military
capabilities of Washington against terrorism and the War on Terror went into effect.
In fighting terrorism however, the United States only exacerbated the problem. For the
past decade, attacks have been increasing. Empirically, the attacks that are categorized as
terrorist have tripled in 2004 to 655 from 175 in 2003.
More importantly, fighting terrorism means stretched resources. Because terrorists
don’t believe in any of the current states, by their nature they are decentralized and the
diffusion of power in them is completely different than a centralized state. Their presence
transcends borders and is therefore hard to contain. This meant that the United States, in its
campaigns to strike terrorist cells, have deployed military assets to different sides of the globe.
Operations were present in the Philippines, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, with intelligence assets
used for support in Africa, Europe, and Asia. This stretched and stressed the American military
capability and as such the ability to use resources in an adequate way.
What does a Realist theory of international politics have to say about terrorists? John
Mearsheimer offers an insight in talking about terrorism and Realist theory and the
international structure. He argued that:
The answer is not a whole heck of a lot. Realism, as I said before, is really all about the
relations among states, especially among great powers. In fact, al Qaeda is not a state, it's a
non-state actor, which is sometimes called a transnational actor. My theory and virtually all
Realist theories don't have much to say about transnational actors. However, there is no
question that terrorism is a phenomenon that will play itself out in the context of the
international system. So it will be played out in the state arena, and, therefore, all of the Realist
logic about state behavior will have a significant effect on how the war on terrorism is fought.
So Realism and terrorism are inextricably linked, although I do think that Realism does not have
much to say about the causes of terrorism.
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In responding the question of whether the Bush legacy has had a positive effect in the
fight against terrorism, he said that :
My basic view, which may sound somewhat odd coming from a Realist, is that the Bush
administration's policy is wrong-headed because it places too much emphasis on using military
force to deal with the problem, and not enough emphasis on diplomacy. I think that if we hope
to win the war on terrorism, or to put it in more modest terms, to ameliorate the problem, what
we have to do is win hearts and minds in the Arab and Islamic world…. I don't believe that you
can do that with military force.

The argument here, he continued, is that excessive force is not what is wanted. The Afghanistan
mission seemed justified, as in a realist context, it was a state that is directly affecting the
security of the United States of America by harboring terrorist AL Qaeda cells, however to rely
heavily on the military might of the United States is the shortcoming.

Conclusion:
The Chinese rise is unquestionable. Economically, it has become one of the largest
trading partners of Asian markets, sometimes replacing the United States directly. It is one of
the largest economies in the world, and is becoming more accessible to world investors. The
Chinese are also one of the largest manufacturing states in the world, which helps create and
immense amount of jobs in the country cementing its growth predictions which is very close to
the United States’ economic size. The country is also growing politically by establishing bilateral
relationships with a lot of the states in the world. The Chinese have namely been investing a lot
in developing countries in Africa, building key infrastructure such as roads and bridges as well
as stadiums in a number of these countries serving the example of a power that is
experimenting with raising its influence around the world. The military is also becoming
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stronger. The gap between the US and China is decreasing, and the military capability of the
Chinese to project power is becoming ever more felt in the military sphere.
In terms of the Russian side of the equation, it has established itself as a player in power
politics in different regions. This is key to highlight in order to suggest that Russia is also
challenging the United States in the international structure hegemony. Although in no way
shape or form is Russia a superpower, it is however a player in the international order and has
recently becoming a challenger to US hegemony of the international structure by its increase in
political and diplomatic influence around the world. The annexation of Crimea was the global
milestone the Russian achieved in order to assert Russian influence in Europe. After decades of
teasing by the Americans and the Europeans in terms of expanding influences of each bloc, the
Russians finally saw a chance. When the crisis in Ukraine happened after EU expansion was
blocked by the Ukrainian President, Putin acted in a swift was in order to establish security of
Russian interest in Ukraine. The warm water port of Sevastopol needed to be guaranteed and
after a referendum in Crimea, Russia took over the Peninsula. In Syria, Putin is the only global
leader who has any sort of influence on Bashar Al Assad. Putin has a cooperation set with Iran
and Syria which are based on military deals and political cooperation on achieving mutual
interests.
Adding the complicating effects terrorism has on the international order, the United
States found itself overstretched, combatting terrorism all over the globe in a “global war on
terror”, involved in two wars in the Middle East, and a rising China in the midst of a global
financial disaster. These issues had numerous effects on the United States position and
perception of threat. Then international structure has been pressuring the United States
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capabilities and that was a threat to its security. The Russian situation only complicated
matters further. The United States had already began a grand strategy to refocus its foreign
policy on a rising China, in the middle of a global financial crisis and a huge campaign to fight
terrorism around the world, when the Middle East destabilized through the Arab Spring and to
complicate matters further the Russians annexed Crimea. Clearly the United States felt
stretched, and as such part of the solution to the problem is to seek stability in the Middle East,
which Egypt was key for as expressed upon in previous chapters.
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Chapter 3: Dilemma in Egypt: Analysis of US Reaction to Egypt’s Arab Spring
This chapter aims at showing that despite any concerns about the rulers of Egypt, the
United States only aimed at securing its interests in the region. In an effort to stabilize the
country and the region, the Obama administration aimed at stability in Egypt to focus on its
grand scale hegemonic plan of refocusing its foreign policy towards a rising challenging China.
In it, I will be discussing how to judge US reactions to the January Revolution and the
coup, on why the United States seemed hesitant to support protestors fighting for more
democratic representation. The argument here is that because outcomes of both Egyptian
uprisings were difficult to predict or anticipate, namely the first one, and the intentions of
potential winners was never fully understood when it comes to these challengers coming of age
into power, the United States employed defensive realist techniques to help overcome these
small-scale versions of the international structure security dilemma scenario, where intentions
of other actors are not fully understood or predicted or known. To be able to secure stability,
secure region interest to refocus on China.

Bush’s Policies and Obama’s Policies
In the early days of the Obama presidency, there had been efforts to stabilize the
relationship with Egypt under Mubarak after a period of unrest between America and its allies
in general. The George W. Bush legacy left a dent in American international relations and Egypt
was all but an example of that. The visit to Cairo on 4 th of June 2009 was named “A New
Beginning” and that Egypt was chosen because “it is a country that in many ways represents
the heart of the Arab world” as then White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs told
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reporters40. This was intended to be the first step in amending relations with the Muslim world
as the United States was not viewed in a positive light after the 8 years of the Bush foreign
policy in the Middle East that had wreaked havoc in the region and severely damaged relations
with the Muslim world.
Egyptians’ view of the US by Gallup was not favorable. From a pure statistical point of
view, it is surprising given the official statistics of military and economic ties the US and Egypt
has had with each other. Gallup polled that the leadership approval ratings of the US in the
World according to Egyptians in 2011 reached 19%, the same as in 2010 and worse than in 2009
which stood at 37%. Egyptian certainly didn’t believe in 2008 that the US wanted to establish
any sort of democratic systems in the region as an incredible 75% believed so. In contrast to
63% in 2005, there is a significant jump and continued disapproval of the US image in the region
despite the levels of foreign assistance funding Egypt received from American agencies,
including more than $1.3 billion in military aid annually and more than $5 billion in
development aid between 2000 and 2008. Still, when asked if the United States is serious about
improving the economic lot in this region, Egyptians have consistently disagreed.
The Obama administration numerously stated that it needed to address the growing
influence of China in Asia. From a realist’s perspective, the growing influence of a player in the
international system needs to be addressed by the most powerful state of the structure that is
the United States. A growing and influencing China can cause deep trouble for policy makers in
the United States interests in Northeast Asia such as the securing of the borders of key Asian
allies such as Japan and South Korea.
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Egyptians did not like American politics, Obama needed to shift his foreign policy focus
to Asia, George Bush had left a negative legacy in the Middle East, and yet there still continued
an American-Egyptian relationship that has not changed much over decades. One after the
other, American Presidents worked with Egyptian strongmen to execute US foreign policy and
secure US interests in the region41.
Egypt itself was not the most credible evidence for the US to promote its legitimacy
campaign on the basis of promoting democratic values. The Egyptian 25th January uprising was
unprecedented in modern Egyptian history. Thirty years of Mubarak’s reign has not been kind
to the Egyptian economy, political scene and youth. Very low rates of savings, a persistent
balance of trade deficit, and weak performance of the two main commodity sectors: agriculture
and manufacturing can all explain the relatively low growth rate in the national output over the
years of Mubarak’s Presidency and high rates of unemployment42. Indeed, there is a laxity to
private and foreign investment in the last two sectors, with the largest chunk of that going to
the petroleum sector which has a low impact on the level of unemployment compared with
other sectors. In addition, Egypt has been plagued with corruption since the establishment of
the Republic in 1952. With big government socialist policies of Nasser which expanded the
bureaucracy brought together with the Open Door economic policy of Sadat followed by
Mubarak’s soft approaches to combatting corruption led to an exuberance of such practices in
Egyptian life.
As for June 30th, there had been multiple shortcomings the MB had done when in power
that led to their decapitation from power. Rising food prices, long lines in gas stations, multiple
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daily electricity cuts in the middle of the Egyptian summer “have set Egyptians on the edge”43
with clashes between pro-Mori and anti-MB protestors a common theme in Egyptian daily
news. Politically, the events of the constitutional assembly and the isolation of almost all
political forces in Egypt from governing and participating in the political process led to the
disillusionment of many. Morsi’s was pleasing the MB over the political forces in the country,
expanding Brotherhood ministers. He granted himself total executive authority with no
oversight and ramming an Islamist constitution through to ratification44 drawing the ire of the
opposition and then unleashing Brotherhood supporters on peaceful protestors on December
3rd around the Presidential Palace. The stage was being set for a confrontation between the
military and the Muslim Brotherhood. Professor of Religion and International affair at
Georgetown University John Esposito wrote in his article for Huffington Post “Egypt’s Coup: Is it
Déjà vu All Over Again?” that the “Brotherhood simply did not have the ability to move quickly
and effectively to garner sufficient popular support which enabled hard-line anti-governmental
factions to mobilise diverse sections of society with legitimate concerns and grievances”45.
The notion of creating allies in a realist world is not new or alien to realism. As it will be
further referenced in this thesis, Stephen Walt, a prominent Defensive Realist, is an American
professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of
Government, concurs with the notion that states can have allies in the anarchic international
structure if making such alliances would serve to maximize a state’s own security but that the
allies should be “strong, stable and don’t pose major strategic problems for them”46. Egypt
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though was becoming one, but because Egypt is vital to securing those US interests in the
region, the US couldn’t afford to lose Egypt especially if it wanted to create stability in the
region, serving its bigger interest of focusing on the challenging rise of power of China.

The Muslim Brotherhood As a Threat to US Interests
The January uprising came along to be a revolution that aimed at social justice and
equality, removing corruption and instigating political reform, but because of the political
oppression itself that was done by the US’ ally Mubarak there had not been enough room for
political parties to maneuver as well as they would do in more democratic environment.
Political opposition groups lacked enough power and support from the public to be of any
viable threat to the political establishment of Egypt and as such there were serious concerns
about the aftermath of a post Mubarak away from power scenario. The only viable political
opposition that was credible enough to be able to have enough popular support as well as the
political will to rule Egypt was the Muslim Brotherhood.
The most organized group of people in Egyptian political opposition at the time of the
January Revolution in Egypt was arguably the Muslim Brotherhood47. Their Islamist tendencies
and religious roots along with their branching and networking around the world, particularly in
the Middle East has made them a worrisome subject for the US and the security of its interests
in the region.48 Bruce Rutherford in his 2009 book Egypt after Mubarak was an exploration into
the future of the Egyptian political scene in a post-Mubarak era. The author focused on
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featuring a stable political future for the Egyptian people but explores how there are only two
truly organized groups that are effective in Egyptian politics; the Judicial system and the Muslim
Brotherhood. The later obviously the only the one having any sort of political will to hold
power.
For some analysts, the Islamist group that is the Muslim Brotherhood at the time was a
threat to US interests if they were to seize power. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) at the time
was one of the most vocal anti-Israel and anti-US groups in the region. Prior to Mohamed
Morsy wining the Egyptian Presidential elections in 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood were antiCamp David Accords, anti-Israel with rhetoric that threatened Israel to be abolished and Jews to
be killed, name-calling the United States in Egyptian Parliament and accusing the US to be
behind almost any major upheaval that happens in the region. Former Muslim Brotherhood
Supreme Guidance Counselor, the highest office in the MB hierarchy, Mahdi Akif once said that
“We believe that Zionism, the United States, and England are gangs that kill children and
women and men and destroy houses and fields. ... Zionism is a gang, not a country. So we will
resist them until they don't have a country”49. Indeed the Arabic language (but not the English
language) website of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has displayed much anti-Semitic and
anti-Israel content with articles engaging in Holocaust denial, condemning the Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty, calling for the destruction of Israel and defeating US “imperialism”.
In his assessment to the US Congress of the situation in Egypt, on February 11th, 2011
Middle East expert Jeremy Sharp talked about the Muslim Brotherhood’s apparent position in
the Egyptian political scene along with US perceptions of the group in his research paper
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directed at the implications of the January 25th Revolution on US foreign policy. He describes
the situation of the MB’s reputation in the United States political arena as perplexing to
policymakers, “particularly given the complex scenarios posed by regional Islamist groups”. On
the one hand, some policymakers see that “once in power, groups such as the Muslim
Brotherhood will pursue policies counter to U.S. interests in the region or will transform states
into theocracies like Iran” and on the other, the view was that they will be more timid, and that
they will temper their rhetoric once indulged in a fully democratic system to appeal to a wider
audience.
Their power lied in their popular support. This support rested on their superior
organizational hierarchy compared to other political parties which stems to the conception of
the Muslim Brotherhood by Hasan Al Bana. The group capitalized on government shortcomings
since the English were administrating the country by de facto through the Egyptian monarchy
by offering financial aid packages to disadvantaged people whom the government had not
provided for. As the 1952 army coup/revolution erupted and Nasser’s socialist big government
policies could not cope with the growth in the population and the number of graduates form
public universities, more and more people were unable to find much promised jobs and
opportunities for social mobility and expanded wealth as the government had promised and as
such the MB managed to take disadvantaged disfranchised youths and made them their
followers by providing schools, religious education, health care and built hospitals for them,
provided job opportunities and filled such unfilled promises by the government. This continued
through Sadat and Mubarak’s era. Any event that might lead to a power vacuum in the Egyptian
political scene would see them as the most likely group to fill that void.
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As such the Obama administration had to deal very carefully with the events turning out
on the ground in Egyptian squares. The moves seemed to be calculated and wary.

Careful Calculations Suggest Defensive Realism
This suggested that the administration had been purposefully careful and modest in its
policies. Before January 25th it had adopted a position that too much US foreign policy
involvement went against the very spirit of what Obama wanted to achieve in the region.
Indeed, involvement was going too far by Obama’s standards when looking at Bush and by
doing less -particularly during the Arab Spring- meant that the pre-Arab Spring policies of
securing US interests via alliance with Egypt would remain largely intact50.
This can be especially seen in the timings and order of statements made by the State
Department and the President of the US as the 2 weeks of the January 25 th Revolution
unfolded.
On the very first days of the protests, the US administration was selective and wary of
what was being said on its behalf in response to Egypt. On January 25th, 2011, US Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton said that the Egyptian government is stable51 and that "Our assessment is
that the Egyptian government…. is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and
interests of the Egyptian people” in a response to question about the protestors. This was
followed by American Vice President Joe Biden not calling Mubarak a dictator when asked
about the protestors demands and how the Egyptian government should react. He said that
Mubarak was “an ally” in an interview with PBS on January the 27 th. During those first three
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days, protestors’ numbers increased significantly and members of the opposition became
bolder in letting their presence be known amongst the Tahrir gatherers. Former Atomic Agency
Director and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mohamed El Baradei returned to Cairo, and the
Muslim Brotherhood announced it will move its supporters with the masses protesting against
the government after initially declining to join them early on. It was on that third day that the
government ordered the shutdown of almost all mobile telecommunications that involved
gaining internet access and twitter was blocked. The next day, mobile phone services were cut
down as violence erupted in a broader scale across the country and especially in Cairo. Police
retreated from the streets and numerous prisons were broken into with a number of high level
political prisoners and terrorists escaping in addition to common criminals and thieves. Police
stations were ransacked including a number of field officers of Egypt’s infamous “State
Security” secret police.
The United States took steps behind closed doors to try and deal with that. In other
words, the US reacted in ways to try and find the best solution for stability in Egypt in order to
secure its interests. In response to these first few days, Mubarak reacted with little
improvement to the eyes of the protestors. He announced that he will remove his cabinet and
form a new one and that he “was not willing to extend his Presidency beyond September”. This,
according to American reports, did not go well with Obama who had been in a meeting with
national security advisors on January 31st who had been discussing whether to tell Obama to
call Mubarak and whether Obama should make a public statement52. It was later revealed that
President Obama called Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak for 30 minutes after that late
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defying speech promising reforming the Egyptian government while still maintaining his
authority as President. That phone call comprised the pledge for “a better democracy and
greater economic opportunity,” Obama said in brief remarks at the White House following the
call53. “I told him he has a responsibility to give meaning to those words, to take concrete steps
and actions that deliver on that promise”. Obama had started to have enough.

United States Finally Exerting Pressure on Mubarak’s Egypt
In a realist world, an ally is only as important as to whether that state can serve the
purposes of another powerful one. Mubarak was being pressured to know his and Egypt’s place
in the international structure and the hegemon has started to have enough in order to secure
its own interests’ survival.
The signs of the more powerful state in the international structure trying to force Egypt
to adapt became apparent at the same time the former Director of the General Intelligence
Directorate Omar Suleiman was appointed the first Egyptian Vice-President since Hosni
Mubarak himself was he Sadat’s deputy on January 29 th 2011. Obama gave his first speech with
regards to the situation in Egypt on January 30th. He called for an “orderly transition” of power.
This was echoed by his State Secretary Hillary Clinton as she explained that "we [the United
States] are not advocating any specific outcome…. but it needs to be done immediately, with a
process that brings people to the table, and that the Egyptian people can see." Adding that "no
one is satisfied" with the steps Mubarak has taken since the protests for political and economic
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freedom began, she said a transition process was needed "so that no one fills a void . . . what
we don't want is chaos."
Egypt was to risk US support if not complying, but would the US survive having an
unstable ally? And would it survive?
Over the next few days, Mubarak attempted to avoid succumbing to growing pressures
domestically and internationally to step down. He pointed out that his removal from power will
be followed by chaos and that he does not want to risk such an outcome. His message was
echoed by his Vice President who in an interview with Christiana Amanpour of ABC News
managed to strike a one-on-one interview with Omar Suleiman in the heart of Cairo. Omar
Suleiman delivered the iconic phrase in his iconic accent “the Egyptian people should have
democracy when they understand the culture of democracy”. These were all signs of defiance
from the Egyptian ruling authority while working in way to deal with the protestors and the
United States. The ruling authority did not want to have a power void, and did not want the
protests to go on forever. Meanwhile these were the times where the rhetoric of pressure to
“transition power” and succumb to the Egyptian people’s demands” were echoed through the
media hosting US officials. White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs went further saying that
“now is yesterday” for Mubarak transition and the US President himself said that Mubarak
should consider the greater good of Egypt and to take steps to reform the country
democratically. On February 11th, Mubarak delegated his authorities to the Supreme Council of
the Armed Forces (SCAF) and announced that he will resign his post. Celebrations erupted in
Egypt’s squares.
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Defensive Realism Cascades Its Shadow
Prominent defensive realist analyst and political scientist Stephen Walt gave a
noteworthy critique of how a realist would handle the Egyptian events on January 31 st, 2011 on
the well-known Foreign Policy website. In it, he wants “to offer a realist interpretation of what
these events mean for the United States, along with the basic prescription that follows from
that analysis”. On that basis, states want to maximize their own security and want allies that
are “strong, stable, and that do not cause major strategic problems for them” and without
having to worry about an ally’s internal stability. An ally who is internally divided, with a
government that is corrupt or illegitimate is ipso facto less valuable than one whose population
is unified, whose government is legitimate, and that enjoys lots of international support. “For
this reason, even a staunch realist would prefer allies that were neither internally fragile nor
international pariahs, while recognizing that sometimes you have to work with what you have”.
Returning to the chronology of events, January 31st is when Mubarak had started to
form a new cabinet after days of police non-existence, military brought to calm the streets and
a curfew set in the whole of the country for over 86 million people. “Even if Mubarak manages
to cling to power, his regime has been fatally compromised” Walt exclaims. If the United States
is seen as complicit in keeping Mubarak in power, that will certainly anger the Arab nations and
the talk of US values and liberty and freedom spreading would be to no avail. On the other
hand, if there is a change of power, the Muslim Brotherhood seizes it, it will be another form of
threat to US interests as explained before. Indeed the interests and values of the United States
clashed so vividly in the dealing with this turmoil in Egypt.
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Walt continues to contemplate whether Egypt is a strategic partner or a strategic
liability. Egypt is not a major oil producer like Saudi Arabia, is not as influential in the Arab
world as it once was, in part due to the social and economic stagnation that has characterized
the Mubarak era and U.S. support for dictators like Mubarak has been one of al Qaeda’s major
reasons for targeting the United States, as well as a useful recruiting tool. “The real reason the
United States has backed Mubarak over the years is to preserve the Egyptian-Israeli peace
treaty”54. He rests his assurance over the relations between Egypt and the US over that later
part by further assuring that any future government of Egypt will most likely no risk tearing up
the Camp David Accords because such a move would immediately put it at odds with both the
United States and Europe and bring Cairo few tangible benefits.
On August 12th, 2010, Obama sent a five-page memorandum called “Middle East and
North Africa” to Vice President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, White House Press
Secretary Robert Gibbs, Deputy National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon, and other seniors
members of his foreign-policy. The memo started by illustrating the trends in the Middle East.
“progress toward political reform…… has, in some cases, stalled” but that there was “evidence
of growing citizen discontent with the region’s regimes”. Obama’s analysis showed a desire to
balance interests rather than ideals and morals as he continued that “increased repression
could threaten the political and economic stability of some of our allies, leave us with fewer
capable, credible partners who can support our regional priorities”55.
In Obama’s memorandum, the language of the President’s memo is embedded with a
balance towards interests rather than values. “Allies” get assessed according to their “support
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to our [American] regional priorities”. In other words, to sustain the security of US interests in
the region, and for Egypt to continue to be an ally, it needed to serve US interests and secure
them. The US viewed, and still views (as Congressional research Services researcher and Middle
East Expert Jeremy Sharp had noted) Egypt as an important part of its Middle East stability
initiative, namely to mediate the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Aggressive policy decisions though could have proven to be fatal. The few calls that are
calculated, slow and directed at instigating change that is looked upon as favorable by the
Obama administration is better off. Power vacuum is what the US probably feared the most in
Egypt. Evident by the rhetoric of “transition of power”, calls for a “change” in leadership are all
signs of wanting someone to be in charge while the power struggle is kept at a minimal and
reserved for the democratic process of elections. Anarchy in Egypt would mean risking the
stability of an ally that would mean the increased insecurity of US interests in the region by
bringing the Muslim Brotherhood in power, who at the time was seen as a threat to US
interests.

Instability in US Ally Again
In another challenge to the dilemma of the US securing its interests in the region while
maintaining that it is the bastion of freedom and protector of liberty while promoting
democracy around the world, Egypt threw yet another wrench in Obama’s attempt to maintain
the status quo of the Egyptian state. Obama wanted relations with the Middle East stable while
making sure of Egypt’s loyalty to secure US interests as it has been over the past few decades.
On June 30th, 2013 thousands and arguably millions of Egyptian protestors filled the streets of
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Egypt took to the streets against the ruling of President Mohammed Morsi in particular and the
rule of the Muslim Brotherhood over Egypt in general.
Examining the internals, people were less than pleased with the state of the Egyptian
governmental that was set up by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood had
managed to seize power after the 2012 Egyptian Presidential elections. In the first
Parliamentary elections after the January uprising of 2011, Islamist parties gained a majority of
the elections for the first time in modern Egyptian political history with the Muslim
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) winning 37.5% of the seats, followed by Al Nour
party winning 27.8%. From that 2012 Parliament, it was going to decide and select the
members of the Constituent Assembly of Egypt, which is going to be tasked to form the new
Egyptian constitution. This assembly became a thorn in the bush of problems the MB’s rule of
Egypt had to go through.
The First Constituent Assembly had not been representative of the Egyptian people. It
was criticized by many observers due to the predominance of Islamist members -66 out of 100in it. 38 out of the 50 parliamentary members of the constituent assembly were members of
the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party and of the Salafi Al Nour Party. There
were only 6 women and only 5 Copts. Indeed in an April opinion by the state-run Al Ahram
newspaper, 82.3 percent of the 1200 respondents said they wanted the constituent assembly
reformed56. A Second Constituent Assembly was formed after an agreement to form a more
balanced assembly was reached on 7th June 2012. However, a number of parties called for a
boycott of the Constituent Assembly as Islamist factions of the assembly were getting voted in
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at a higher rate and again the parties and the people felt that the assembly was non
representative of the different social groups of the Egyptian population. Indeed, the groups
representing a number of backgrounds announced their withdrawal, namely the Copts,
Christians, and liberal groups such as Bishop Paula of Tanta of the Coptic Orthodox Church,
Bishop Yohana Qalta, who is the Assistant to the Catholic Patriarch in Egypt and Safwat alBayadi, who is the head of the Anglican Communion in Egypt, the New Wafd Party, Ahmed
Maher, a member of the April 6 Youth Movement, Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat, the leader of the
Reform and Development Party, former secretary of the Arab League Amr Moussa, the
Journalists Syndicate Council and the representative of Farmers Syndicate, Mohamed AbdelQader, all withdrew. This was done at the same time of riots and protests in the streets.
The army was not pleased as well. Reasons for demanding Morsi's resignation included
accusations of increasing authoritarianism and his pushing through an Islamist agenda
disregarding the predominantly secular opposition or the rule of law. People did not favor the
MB enough to limit the scope of demonstrations in the streets. Indeed, there had been several
attempts at gathering large numbers of people in front of the Ittihadeya Presidential Palace in
Heliopolis in order to force the MB to surrender power just as much as Mubarak did with the
Tahrir protests. A namely example is the Egyptian Constitution of 2012 gave the President
sweeping powers over the state’s judicial system which has been notably relatively
independent even under Mubarak’s rule57. At a conference on 15 June, Morsi called for foreign
intervention in Syria. According to Yasser El-Shimy, an analyst with the International Crisis
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Group, this statement crossed "a national security red line." The army rebuked this statement
the next day by stating that its only role was to guard Egypt's borders.
The population and the Muslim Brotherhood were arguably at odds a lot during the
Mb’s rule of Egypt. Some of the issues that might have caused the protests and led to the later
removal of Morsi include:
-

Morsi’s Presidential Constitutional Declaration: Morsi granted him the power of
appointing the public prosecutor and makes all his [Morsi's] decisions final and
binding and cannot be appealed by any way or to any entity until the constitution is
approved and a new People's Assembly is elected. It was later abrogated due to
multiple protests and public's anger58 59.

-

The Constitution of 2012: The Muslim Brotherhood and their ruling political party
used their Islamist allies to pass a hotly disputed constitution. Even though it was
approved by 64% of Egyptians who voted, it was noted only about 30% of Egyptians
with voting rights participated in the referendum process60.

-

Power and gas Crises: Repeatedly, there had been a short supply of gas and an
increased number of power outages throughout the country61 62.

-

Security of the state worsened: the most prominent story related to security under
Morsi was the murder of 16 border guards in Sinai in an attack in Rafah.

These internal pressures led to the creation of the “Rebellion” Campaign which aimed at
collecting signatures of Egyptian citizens to express in written format the dissatisfaction of the
Egyptian people with the Morsi regime. It claims to have collected 15 million signatures63.
As such over the course of 3 days, the people of Egypt rose up and protested in the
streets. Tahrir Square was filled once again and the Ittihadeya Presidential Palace was
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surrounded with protestors. The Egyptian Armed Forces issuing a 48-hour ultimatum that gave
the country's political parties until 3rd of July to meet “the demands of the Egyptian people”.
The Egyptian military also threatened to intervene if the dispute was not resolved by then.
This instability in a US ally could have been troublesome for US interests’ security. In
another attempt to secure interests through stabilization of an ally in accordance to the
defensive realist theory we have shown, with the Muslim Brotherhood in power, and in the
midst of all that, US-Egyptian relations continued as normal. In one of the highlight moments of
the MB’s rule, protestors climbed the walls of the United States’ embassy in protests to an antiIslamic movie in the West. The New York Times reported that:
Mr. Morsi issued only a mild rebuke of the rioters — and on Facebook — whiles his
movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, has called for a second day of protests against the lurid
anti-Muslim video that set off the riots. And though the Egyptian police coordinated with
American officials, Mr. Morsi waited 24 hours before issuing his statement against the militants
who stormed the embassy; Libyan authorities issued immediate, unequivocal statements of
regret for the bloodshed in Benghazi.

"I don't think that we would consider them an ally, but we don't consider them an enemy,"
Obama said during an interview with Telemundo channel in the US64. This message was echoed
when White House spokesman Jay Carney told reporters traveling with Obama in Colorado that
“'Ally' is a legal term of art," and that "the president, in diplomatic and legal terms, was
speaking correctly, that we do not have an alliance treaty with Egypt”65.
That is not to say that the relationship had been sour in any way facing this hindrance
from Obama’s administration. Mobility in the Suez Canal was kept the same, with ships of trade
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and war going through. There were continued relations with Israel and evident by a particularly
prominent Presidential letter leaked online from the Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi to his
Israeli counterpart Shimon Perez, expressing him as Morsi’s “Dear Friend”, while there as
continued military cooperation between the Egyptian and Israeli military.
Seeing that the MB had been directly hostile to the West in general ever since their 80
years of existence and the US and Israel in particular the last few decades in official and
unofficial political opposition places in the Egyptian political sphere (particularly the Camp
David Accords), when they became official holders of power in Egypt they generally did not
perform any hostile acts towards the US or Israel and even reassured the world that they will be
upholding the Camp David Accords, the ones that were so hated by them when they were not
in power. Finally, the US aid package was continued and signed by Congress.

Even Clearer Manifestation of Interests vs. Values
In the aftermath of June 30th, the Obama administration had to balance its gains and
losses from interacting with what had been termed a “populist coup”66

67 68.

Three days of

reportedly millions of protestors that ended up with a celebration of these millions to a military
ultimatum that was executed with the help of a majority of the political forces in the country
meant that this was not an ordinary situation the US lawmakers are familiar with.
The Egyptian state had been put the US under a direct pressure in terms of balancing its
values against its grand interest of balance in the Middle East to refocus on China. For the
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United States, one of their closes allies in the region [the Egyptian military] has actually violated
a US law. P.L. 113-76 Section 7008 prohibits foreign assistance to a country “whose elected
head of government is deposed by military coup d’etat or decree”69. This means putting on hold
or even reducing the military and economic aid to the country which will not go well with either
the military or the Egyptian people’s perception of American foreign policy. On the other hand,
going against one of its own laws while also supporting an actual coup would severely damage
US image in the world and undermine its promotion for democracy on the global theatre. It was
an even clearer manifestation of the clash between the values that US domestic laws advocate
and The US’ occasional contradictory interests.
Egypt was not officially sanctioned in general and the US was not hostile in its reaction
to the reality of the situation. It begs the question of the purpose behind that.
For Egypt to secure its own survival in the international structure and the MB in
government to guarantee its own survival in power, the MB was bound to keep the status quo
(at least for the short-term future) in order to maximize on their electoral victory. This goes
beyond the sort of “futile & deceptive” works of writing about motive and ideology looked
upon by other theories that Morgenthau is critical of.
The White House issued a statement that attempted to be balanced and not to appear
as if the United States is taking any particular sides. It called for
….. the Egyptian military to move quickly and responsibly to return full authority back to
a democratically elected civilian government as soon as possible through an inclusive and
transparent process, and to avoid any arbitrary arrests of President Morsy and his supporters.
Given today’s developments, I have also directed the relevant departments and agencies to
review the implications under U.S. law for our assistance to the Government of Egypt.
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The statement did not express any vivid support of the Muslim Brotherhood, insisting only on
indiscriminate arrests like they would treat any political prisoner. It has no expressed
opposition for the military beyond what has been illegal in US law. It called for a return to “a”
democratically elected government not “the” government of Morsy. These are the attempts
that can be extrapolated from the statement with regards to the US opinion on the coup in its
immediate aftermath.
The problem of the statement is that it did not reflect the opinion of the Egyptian
people on the coup, or its aftermath. The Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research (Baseera)
polled the President Abd El Fatah Al Sisi at 82% after 80 days of his Presidency and that 67% of
people were happy with the dispersal of Muslim Brotherhood supporters in sit-ins by the state
security with Mohamed Morsi already having his approval ratings going down before the coup
and the faith in the army still at a high note.
In an article for Al Jazeera, Professor John Esposito claimed that the US was living in
denial about what happened on June 30th, and that the US should “acknowledge that the
overthrow of an elected government replaced by military-appointed official, is a coup”70. The
problem presents itself differently than January 25 th. In January, there had been no official or
apparent direct reasoning that could be argued in order for someone to label what happened in
2011 as a coup, at least the argument is not as strong as the counter-argument that it wasn’t.
However, in June 2012, the military had been taking direct control over proceedings, issuing an
ultimatum to the President, gathering political forces in the country to debate the next steps to
be taken. “The US and Europe will be judged against their espoused principles and values, their
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commitment to the promotion of democracy and human rights. Thus far they are failing the
test” argued Esposito. However, the US cares about one particular matter, it’s interests security
in the region which Egypt provides.
In an article describing his advocacy for not cutting aid to Egypt, Robert Satloff,
Executive Director of the Washington Institute, argues that Obama is wise “not to diminish US
influence further by cutting ties with the Egyptian military”. As already discussed, EgyptianAmerican relations are very tight when it comes to the military. Indeed the Egyptian Air Force is
the second largest operator of F-16s in the world, and the Egyptian Army has the most tanks in
African and Arabia, namely American A1 Abrams tanks, plus a Navy which is almost exclusively
made up of American-built ships. He argues that US aid to Egypt cemented a broader bilateral
relationship that included security cooperation, counter terrorism operations and preferential
treatment to US ships transiting through the Suez Canal and US planes flying over Egyptian
airspace. Cutting aid would risk these privileges and cooperation points and that risks US
interests in the region.
The White House decided to play both hands in the same round, trying to balance the
interests and values, the problem is that the military viewed the confrontation with the Muslim
Brotherhood as an existential affair. Some labeled the reaction of the White House as “cold to
the undemocratic nature of his [Morsi’s] ouster”71, but the military may have chosen the ironfist approach precisely because Washington seemed more interested “in salvaging the
Brotherhood as a political actor” rather than siding with many –perhaps a majority-72of
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Egyptians eager to remove the Brotherhood from power and even from the political scene
entirely.
The opportunities that Obama had during terms as US President meant that he had the
options on what school of thought his foreign policy would under. To be able to elaborate more
on why Defensive Realism is the way to understand the policies of the United States with
regards to Egypt, we need to understand more about the Obama foreign policy in his two
terms.
For us to understand the basis for how Obama reached his decisions with regards to his
foreign policy, we need to address Obama’s perception of the world, and as the President of
the United States, he is part of the elite perception. A key structural modifier in defensive
realism.

Conclusion:
The importance of Egypt to the United States can be traced to the interests of US in the
Middle East. The Arabian oil and the security of Israel are the most important feature of
American influence in the region, because the United States wants the flow of energy and the
survival of Israel for important domestic and historical reasons. Egyptian relations with America
were titled on that.
The United States has long had interests in the Middle East, especially since the end of
World War II. Securing US interests over the years entitled creating alliances in the region,
Egypt became the ally of the United States and thus came an important point in American
relations with the Arab world. Nowadays, Egypt’s stability meant that It can serve diplomatic
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relations with the region’s states in an effort to serve US interests. With Egypt stable, it can
affect the stability in the Middle East –or rather stabilize the unstable Middle East- via its
diplomatic ties, namely in assisting and mediating the peace process between Israel and the
Palestinians. This will lead to a decrease in the usage of resources by the United States in the
region in securing its own interests by having allies that serve those interests. This will lessen
the stretch of the American forces and will mean the United States will be able to refocus more
of its resources to address international structure pressures.
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Chapter 4: Obama The Realist
In this chapter, I will elaborate more on the concept of elite perception of Obama. This
will be followed by an explanation of Obama perception of the world via his writings, book,
speeches and actions as President of the United States. The perception of Obama is important
because he one of the driving forces of foreign policy making in his Presidency.
This chapter aims at delivering the point of Obama being a realist, arguing that his
actions and perceptions of the world are proof that defensive realism is the best theory to be
used in interpreting the results of the actions done by the Obama administration.

Elite Perception and Defensive Realism
Jeffery Taliaferro, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tufts University, talks about
the realization of security under anarchy while discussing defensive realism’s attributes in
achieving such an aim in his article “Security Seeking under Anarchy”. One of his discussions of
defensive realism included the talk about the importance of elite perception. Leaders weigh
options and make decisions based on their strategic situations and “an assessment of relative
power”.
Elite perception is an international structure modifier. Leaders’ perceptions of the risk of
the world and their understanding of the position of their state in the international order will
lead to adopting strategies and taking of decisions that are in the interests of the state. What
dictates their mistake or level of correctness will depend on the elite’s perceptions of the risks
around them and whether they comply with the realist nature of the international structure or
not.
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It is the reason for the outbreak of conflicts essentially. Along with numerous other
factors such as the security dilemma and geography, elite perception is an anomaly which can
upset the balance of power rather than evidence of fundamental offensive realist assumption
that states increase their relative power as a result of the anarchical structure of the
international system. These perceptions act in ways such as inflating threats to mobilise
resources and promote expansion, or inhibit elites from recongnising their declining power in
their international system due to prioritizing domestic concerns over international concerns for
instance. It helps explain the reasons behind mistakes in the real world.

Realist Idealist
The opportunities that Obama had during terms as US President meant that he had the
options on what school of thought his foreign policy would under. To be able to elaborate more
on why Defensive Realism is the way to understand the policies of the United States with
regards to Egypt, we need to understand more about the Obama foreign policy in his two
terms. For us to understand the basis for how Obama reached his decisions with regards to his
foreign policy, we need to address Obama’s perception of the world.
Since 2009 when Obama assumed the office of President of the United States of
America, he had his plate full. The negative remnants of the Bush legacy on the whole globe in
terms of relations with international allies and partners and in particular the Middle East where
the US had been going through 2 ongoing wars at the time of Obama assuming office, on the
back of a huge $800 Billion bailout of the banks in order to ease the suffering American
economy which has been weighted down by a global financial crisis in 2008, dealing with anti-
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American hostilities and the radicalization of Arab and Muslim youth spreading anti-Western
and anti-American ideals, which was not helped by the fact that the efforts for democracy
promotion by Bush had assumed a picture of distrust between America and its long time
autocratic Arab leaders. Obama faced distrust by the international community, his allies, the
youth in the Arab and Middle Eastern region and 2 active military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan and was tasked to lead the nation in the midst of that turmoil.
To be able to counter all of the negatives that he inherited from Bush and to be able to
perform any sort of progress that fell under his line of thought of what America’s foreign policy
should be, Obama adopted policies that observers called him a “Realist Idealist”73 74.
Obama as a realist can be seen in his speech to the UN General Assembly in 2013. In a
review of Obama’s speech at the UN, Stewart M Patrick of the Council on Foreign Relations
describes Obama’s speech as a “high-profile occasion” to assert that the world cannot “remedy
every evil” but that it should not accept the “cold logic of mass graves”. He noted Obama’s
pragmatic tone in the speech and the President’s recognition of the inherent limits of US power
while assuring that Obama’s ultimate vision for world order is liberal and internationalist.
Obama notes that “The United States has a hard-earned humility when it comes to our ability
to determine events inside other countries” and Patrick sees that these lessons learned from
such actions helped guide the Obama administration’s policies towards Egypt75. It’s the reason
why the US government has avoided choosing between Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood and
the military government that came after them in a coup and an uprising. The author thinks that
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that is because Obama knows that the United States cannot determine events inside other
countries freely, Egypt’s future would be made by Egyptians themselves. “What the United
States would continue to insist on, he [Obama] said, was movement toward an inclusive,
democratic government.
While being a realist, he still instilled idealist points of view. Obama declares that
“America is exceptional” because it repeatedly had shown its willingness to “stand up not only
for our own narrow self-interest, but for the interests of all”. Obama continued to say that the
world we live in is “a world of imperfect choices”, and as such observers note that it is often
difficult for Obama to translate “universal” ideals into practical foreign policy doctrines. It
seemed in the speech that Obama acknowledges that to preserve the United States’ core
interests, it needed to work with some unsavory regimes, like for instance the Mubarak
government, or the Muslim Brotherhood, or the military in Egypt. Looking at his actions with
Iran, Afghanistan and Egypt, we can see a pattern of giving diplomacy a chance despite his
realist tendencies. Obama’s speech at the UN had been paraphrased and summarized by John
Cassidy, a reporter in the New Yorker76, into the following:
The United States remains devoted to the values of liberty and democracy, but it is an
increasingly reluctant global hegemon. In protecting its core interests, such as the supply of
cheap energy and the defeat of anti-American terrorist groups, it will use all elements at its
disposal, including military action. But, in general, it much prefers to seek a diplomatic solution.
Obama had earmarked four main elements of “core interests” of the United States in the
Middle East which were: protecting allies from foreign aggression, dismantling of terrorist
networks, preventing the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
free flow of energy. But Obama also insisted the following:
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To say these are America’s core interests is not to say these are our only interests… I also
believe that we can rarely achieve these objectives through unilateral American action. Iraq
shows us that democracy cannot be imposed by force.

Indeed he notes Egypt as to “reflect a larger point”77, that the US government will work with
governments that do not meet the highest of standards of the international community but
that do work with the United States’ core interests, or secure US interests.
After two years in office, we can say with some certainty where Obama’s instincts lie.
From his position with regards to the so called “war on terror” to the current unrest in Egypt,
Obama’s foreign policy has shown that it was more in line with conservative realpolitik than to
any left liberal vision of the international relations environment78. Looking at Obama’s actions
with regards to the January Revolution and it seems that the administration’s real goal had
been to dispense with Mubarak while keeping the military subordinates very much still in
charge of the transition period. These are the same military officers and political elite who have
dominated Egyptian domestic politics and had the Egyptian political environment under a
controlled climate. Indeed, it had been later reported that Omar Suleiman, a key US strategic
friend as heading the Egyptian intelligence community that had been responsible for part of the
CIA’s rendition program. Ross Douthat, a political writer in the New York Times says “This isn’t
soft-headed peacenik dithering. It’s cold-blooded realpolitik”. He further cements these ideas
by saying that the “situation [in Egypt is one] that calls for great caution, rather than grand
idealistic gestures”.
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Obama supported Hosni Mubarak until the moment Mubarak needed the US the most.
Obama abandoned him and supported the people in the streets, eventually. Then, just as many
had warned, the Muslin Brotherhood rode into power. Recognizing the demands of the
moment, Obama then supported Morsi and his ambassador Anne Patterson scolded protestors
that went into the streets against Morsi calling for respect of the democratic process of
elections. Then at the moment that Morsi needed the US the most, Obama abandoned him.
Fareed Zakaria, a lead political analyst for CNN had labeled the US President as a “realist, by
temperament, learning and instinct”. Stephen Walt even saluted the President’s efforts and
even called him in a title for a piece for Foreign Policy magazine “Is Barack Obama More of a
Realist than I?”.
Obama’s White House had countered numerous conservative and liberal advocates that
tried to explain Obama’s policies as either realist or liberal by saying that the President is only
interested in what works79. Dr. Fawaz Gerges, a leading political scientist in the London School
of Economics, remarks in his publication for the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding
and the Duke Islamic Studies Center and ISLAMiCommentary, that the White House was
explaining that Obama sees the world as more complex than what the Cold War had to offer
and that specific approaches are needed and are to be tailored according to each situation.
Obama didn’t consider himself a man with a foreign policy doctrine and “was not averse to
revisiting previous decisions that he had made”. Although that all might be true, that does not
negate the fact that the actions and decisions being taken by the Obama administration is
completely on the money when it comes to explaining them in the terms of defensive realism.
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The structural changes in terms of outside international pressure escalated on Obama as
well as Egypt. According to Stephen Walt’s article ….. The relationship between allies can only
be maintained when the smaller state can still maintain the security of interests of the more
powerful state in the international structure. Egypt went through phases where it could have
been described as an ally that is unsafely unstable.
In his paper “Obama and the Arab Spring”, Dr. Anthony Cleso of the Security Studies
Department of the Angelo State University in Texas tries to describe vividly how Obama reacted
to the Arab Spring revolutions and attempting at defining Obama’s foreign policy views which
he describes as a “merge [of] idealism with ‘Post-American World’ realism”. The book was
Obama’s perception of the United States’ role in international politics.
For that, he heavily depends on Obama’s books Audacity of Hope. Obama critiques
Bush’s actions as a throwback to Reagan’s evil empire and Theodor Roosevelt imperialism
allowing the United States to move unilaterally provoking armed conflict against “governments
not of our[US] liking”. This, in Obama’s eyes, was resurrecting Cold War dynamics that
demonized Iraq War critics as “soft”. Obama was sure that the war only helped raising the
image of the United States being seen as an imperial nation that is engaged in permanent
warfare which acts as a catalyst for anti-American sentiment across the world, not just the
Middle East. Using the military as a tool of democracy promotion was criticized by Obama.
Obama was more concerned with a refocus of foreign policy towards Asia.
In his chapter, The World Beyond Our Borders, Obama draws a complex vision of
America’s position in the world and the environment of the world we are living in where
“international trade, law and norms are the key to stability and prosperity”. Borrowing heavily
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from Fareed Zakaria and Joseph Nye –two realist political analysts- Obama maintains that the
US is in relative decline in terms of hard power and the that soft power and trade has become
transcendent in the world. Obama writes that the military has become one of many tools that
the United States has among many to formulate its foreign policy. Therefore, Obama sees that
the US should be engaged in hardheaded analysis of the costs and benefits of the use of force
compared to other tools available especially given the example of Bush’s second
administration’s problems using unilateralism and military action as the arbitrator of foreign
policy formulation. It showed the limits of US power80. Obama sees that America needs to
repair this damage by showing more restraint, and urging cooperation. The author thinks that is
suggesting a humble and remorseful America that can be “a catalyst for international healing of
US image”.
In his book, Obama maintains that he sees America as “exceptional”. He sees his country
as special because it advocates for liberal democracy and free market and that pushing the
international system towards more democracy and free markets will lead to greater equality,
justice and prosperity and that the US should promote them as both American interests and the
interests of the struggling world. Obama recognizes the urgency of America unilateral action in
select cases, and that makes it apparent that the “Obama world view balances competing
interests and refuses to adopt fast and hard rules and his ideas are contextually adjusted case
by case”81. Obama descriptively says that the US has a right to take unilateral military action “to
eliminate an imminent threat to our security”, a heavy dose of realism underscored here.

80
81

Barack Obama. “The Audacity of Hope”. Crown/Three Rivers Press. 17th October 2006.
Anthony Celso. “Obama and the Arab Spring”. Angelo State University. March 2012.

80

In terms of human rights and democracy promotion and their role in US foreign policy,
he argues that when the US seeks to impose democracy with force, the US “assert ourselves for
failure”, yet Obama concludes that the US can inspire other people to assert their freedoms and
that the US can talk on behalf of local leaders whose rights are violated in any way and to apply
economic and diplomatic pressure who repeatedly violate these US norms. He is against using
force for democracy promotion but does not rule out intervention in the case of genocide and
ethnic cleansing provided that there is enough international support. Professor Celso describes
that this complexity with regards to human rights, democracy and Obama’s realism may explain
his actions with the Arab Spring movement.
In response to the January revolution, Obama had waffled his earlier support for
Mubarak and wanted to pave the way to a democratic transition engineered by the military
allies that the US had in Egypt. The administration was surprised by the protests and feared
jeopardizing the relations with Egypt as the US relied on Egypt for anti-terrorism operations and
peace with Israel to stabilize the region. As Professor Celso suggests, “the administration’s
efforts to balance strategic interests with humanitarian impulses outlined in [Obama’s book]
proved difficult to implement in the Egyptian case”82. Indeed, Obama’s policies are driven by
“strategic core interests”, an outside example is for instance allowing repression of the Shia
majority in Bahrain for instance with no real initiatives to press Gulf countries to democratize
because it wished not to give Shia majority Iran any more influence in the Middle East and as
such the Administration needs the Saudi support for its containment policies towards Iran.
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It is of great irony that Obama who had lobbied so much for a turn away from Bush
policies that he can be described as a continuation of US policies in the region. By strategic
necessity Obama’s policies fell back to Bush administration’s policies. Obama’s anti-terror
policies remained consistent with the Bush era, with Predator drones strikes and Guantanamo
Bay prison complex still open. Democracy promotion had taken a reduced funding by repeated
Obama administrations as for instance a proposal for a $770 million Middle East and North
Africa Incentive Fund had been abandoned in favor of a much smaller MENA Initiative Fund that
emphasizes development rather than political or economic reform83.
Obama’s perception of the United States’ role in the world meant that he wanted the
United States to continue its policy of promoting liberty and free market policies but not at the
expense of the interests of the US. This included a stable Middle East, reliable Arab allies while
containing to demand for a secure Israel and free flow of energy resources and a refocus on
China. The refocus on China will entail that the economic and military constraints on the US
needed to be addressed in order for the state to be able to reinstate its hegemonic powers over
the regions that saw the rise of challengers to US influence in the world. China posed that
threat, and with an unstable Middle East, lack of trust from allies, engagement in two wars, for
Obama to meet his expectations with his with perceptions meant that there had to be stability
in the Middle East and a reduction in the pressure and stress the American armed forces had
been going through in order to be able to manifest any sort of proper increase in the influence
of the American hegemon after the decline of such influence in Northeast Asia.
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Conclusion:
Elite perception of Obama helps in maintains the view that the United States have been
deploying defensive realism in its foreign policy. The notion that Obama has expressed in his
assessment of world politics when he was a Senator, and then as a campaigner for US
Presidency shows that elaboration. The Obama foreign policy focused on reassessing America’
capabilities in light of global challenges. The Chinese are rising, and American influence has
declined, as well as US image. The American foreign policy has been hampered by the US
capabilities being overstretched across the globe and it is becoming less efficient to conduct
operations to insure the United States’ survival.
Obama advocated from the start to refocus American foreign policy on China. He was
not deterred when the Arab Spring happened, not when the Egyptian coup happened, and not
even when Russian annexed Crimea. His accounts of what he wanted, along with his decisions
while President, and his actions as an acting US President are evidences that structural realism
is sued in policy explanation. Defensive realism offers the best explanation for Obama’s actions
as President as he is consistent with it tenants and its rhetoric.
The fact that the Obama administration have cut aid though is a mistake that further
cements the proposition that defensive realism is the way to explain the grand strategy of the
United States. By characterizing the cutting of aid as a mistake, it mean it went array of the
consistent theoretical framework the policies have been following, and as such a deviation
means it will probably have adverse effects on the United States.

83

Chapter 5: The Potential Loss of a US Ally
In this chapter, I will examine the cutting of millions of dollars of US aid to Egypt, and
the hold of attack helicopters and fighter jets that were on route to be delivered to Egypt. This
was a grave mistake in a most realists’ eyes.
The chapter aims to reinforce a few features of the Egyptian-American relationship.
This relationship is based upon security cooperation, namely military cooperation, and
intelligence sharing in the fight against terrorism. The Egyptian military has been set up with a
huge amount of American military hardware over the years that a majority of the backbone of
the Egyptian armed forces is trained on American equipment. The after effects of a halt in
securing military equipment for Egypt while the latter is involved in anti-terror raids and
operations gives off a bad signal to Egyptian political elites and the Obama administration could
be dealing with losing degree of influence on the Egyptian state.
This chapter aims at presenting this cut of aid as an anomaly. This mistake cost the US a
millions of dollars in potential defense contracts as Egypt has now been pushed towards buying
more Russian and Chinese equipment to replace or at best augment the existing American
military hardware it has. This is indeed an increase of influence for American challengers of its
hegemony in the world.

A Misunderstanding of the Egyptian Situation
Even if we stipulate that the cutting of aid was going to happen because of the domestic
laws of the United States, it was still up to the United States represented by the Obama
administration to acknowledge the coup and react to the events of the uprising in Egypt. By
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choosing the path of cutting or suspending part of the aid package to Egypt, realists agree that
it was a mistake84

85,

further confirming the path that the US had originally been taking since

the January uprising had been in line with the thoughts of defensive realism.
In his article “Obama Just Made a Terrible Mistake in Egypt”, Eric Trager, an expert on
Egyptian politics and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt who is a fellow at the Washington
Institute, argues that cutting aid will cost the US influence over Egypt, however diminished it
may have been, without attaining any noticeable gains for “either American geo strategy or
democratic prospects within the country [Egypt]”. He believes that the call to cut off aid would
reflect a misunderstanding of the events that transpired over the 2012 summer, and the MB’s
Presidency. “By the time unprecendentally mass protests against the Muslim Brotherhood’s
rule commenced on June 30th, Mohammed Morsi was a president in name only” after his
constitutional declaration which gave him unlimited powers with no oversight, ramming the
Islamist constitution through ratification severely uncut his popular legitimacy and narrowed his
support to the MB’s side of the political pool. The Mb’s violent removal of anti-Presidential
protestors around the Presidential Palace also made the MB may be viewed as brutal and
authoritarian. Rather than build consensus with other political factions, the MB chose to isolate
themselves with the majority of political power undermining their own legitimacy with arguably
a majority of Egyptians. Many “share the military’s fear of a resurgent Muslim Brotherhood,
which is why they have broadly endorsed the military’s brutal crackdown on the organization.
The author argues that Washington can only watch and cannot change the events going on as
the army is engaged in an existential struggle. Any form of discontinuity of relations between
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Egypt and the US would put at risk US interests as Egyptian-American military cooperation
might be affected.

Fearing Egypt’s Response
The cutting of aid presented a peculiar problem for the US in the light that it needs to
seek stability in the region to refocus foreign policy objectives to China. Security Cooperation is
one of the objectives of US-Egyptian relations that had been fundamentally based on the
security of US interests in the Middle East. The military aid program has been largely unaffected
over the years due to several factors; firstly, there was always fear of Cairo revoking
Washington’s US Navy preferential treatment in accessing the Suez Canal, secondly, American
firms will suffer from cutting of military contracts, thirdly, foreign competitors gaining an
additional hand and more influence in Egypt. Each can be debated on its own, but each can
underwhelm the foundation for one of Washington’s largest military assistance programs over
the past few decades86.
Egypt has been engaged in exhaustive military operations against non-state actors on its
borders for a long time now. Several hundreds of security officers, soldiers, personnel and
equipment have been lost to terrorist activities all over Egypt’s map and ever since the removal
of Mohamed Morsi from power and the country has been ravaged with numerous attacks and
threats. From home-made amateur shrapnel bombs distributed all throughout Cairo and
coordinated attacks on police and military checkpoints to grand scale attacks on military bases
and positions in Sinai, the security forces in Egypt are being tested daily. Egypt sought
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confirmations and acceptance from Israel with American moderation to allow the entry of a big
number of army soldiers in Sinai as per the articles of the Camp David Accords, and the
Egyptian Air Force fighter jets conducted strikes for the first time in Sinai since the 1973 War,
armed drones, constant Apache strikes and coordinated military engagements have been
hitting the headlines in Egyptian news outlets since 2013 coup. The calls of cutting the military
aid in the midst of all that seems against US interests of securing a stable Egyptian ally.
Moreover, the cutting of aid will represent a major misunderstanding of the events in
Egypt. To say that the military had removed a democratically elected president from office is to
overlook a certain reality, that by the time the military removed Morsi from power, he had only
been President in name only. The unprecedented mass protests were rumoured to rival the
numbers of the people in the streets over the course of the 2 weeks that saw Mubarak
removed from power. Morsi’s actions that resulted in a rammed constitution made by an
assembly that saw the resignation and self-withdrawal of almost all but the Islamist
movements,

constitutional declaration putting the President’s decisions above judicial

overview and the attacks on peaceful protestors on December 3 rd 2012 at the Ittihadeya Palace
severely undercut the Muslim Brotherhood’s legitimacy in power comparing it to a fascist
regime87.
The Muslim Brotherhood also did not do much to help cement its position in the state
by alienating state officials as well. The massive Egyptian bureaucracy catalyzed substantial
resistance to his rule within the state itself88. Morsi had appointed Brotherhood-affiliated
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ministers who had tried to divert government resources to the group’s organizational goals
rather than build consensus with their respective governmental bodies. Morsi’s ministers began
resigning from his government and Morsi was starting to lose control.
A President of 85 million people, mostly impoverished, starting to lose control over his
cabinet meant that there were no happy endings in sight. Protests started erupting.
The military –as previously discussed- was more liked by the Egyptian public. There was
trust in them and the Brotherhood did nothing to decrease that level of trust the people had in
the army, and did less to mitigate any anatomization of the army. The army generals saw the
Brotherhood as a threat.

The Policy Implications
It is important for Washington to understand that it cannot change or exert influence
actors who are engaged in an existential struggle. Numerous Islamist organizations are calling
for President Sisi’s death, and as such when Washington tries to exert an influence on the
Egyptian military to reconcile with the Brotherhood, the administration is actually pressuring
the generals of Egypt into their own suicide, or so they could think so. For instance, June 22 nd
2013 saw US Secretary of State John Kerry visit Egypt, and his visit was focusing on enduring the
bilateral relationship Egypt has with the US and ensure US commitment to “seeing Egypt
succeed”, but thorny issues remain such as the declarations that “Egypt is yet to meet the
requirements for reinstatement [of military aid]”89. This policy actually will and has increased
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Egyptians’ paranoid belief that the US desire the Brotherhood rule in Egypt which Egyptians see
as a far more threatening issue than military rule.
The policy is a lose-lose proposition. The United States needs Egypt to secure its
interests in the region in order to refocus its resources on the rising challenge of China to US
hegemonic power in the world. Egypt secures America’s preferential access to the Suez Canal,
and increase the efficiency of counter-terrorism operations, while Egypt needs military
hardware and international investment. Cutting of the aid, however it may be reasoned as,
pushed Egypt to take action. By taking advantage of the security interests of Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates in Egypt, the Gulf countries supplied Egypt with over $18 billion in
economic aid and it is expected that the military contracts that have been signed with France
and Russia come from the Gulf countries90. In terms of military hardware, Egypt have secured
24 Rafale 4th+ generation fighter jets from France, becoming its launch customer, which are
more advanced and can carry more fuel and ammunition than the American F-16s. In addition,
the Egyptian Navy has secured the acquisition of 4 brand new Gowind combat ships, with 3 to
be built in Egypt, while also securing at least one FRIMM frigate in the beginning of 2015. The
first of the hardware of this French-Egyptian arms deal will be delivered by the opening of the
New Suez Canal. In addition, and more remarkably important is that Egypt is now enjoying
better ties with Russia. Egypt secured one of the most feared Anti-Aircraft and anti-missile
defense systems in the world, the S-300 long range Surface-to-Air Missile System and Egypt is
expected to sign deals worth billions of dollars with Russian aircraft manufacturers and air
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defense systems companies in the coming few months. This is significant given the rise in
Russian influence in the region, namely because of the Syrian conflict.
This approach to Egypt has been shortsighted for the US, and is a mistake. If a policy is
adopted by the United States that does not fall under the national interest of securing
American interests in the Middle East via Egypt then it is a failure. The United States have
wanted stability in Egypt, to help stabilize the Middle East, in order to refocus foreign policy
resources towards China. The cutting of aid has put the foundation of Egyptian-American
relations at minimal risk, but still at risk of decreased influence for the US over Egypt with a cost
towards American military contractors, that foundation is the Egyptian-American military
cooperation. The cutting of aid will result in the loss of some influence over Egypt without
achieving any of the goals the United States wants to be raised when it comes to its values, and
it might put at risk the security of interests of the country in the region. “It is an unforced error
in the extreme”91.
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Conclusion
The United States has been the most powerful regional hegemon and some may argue it
is the global hegemon. Being the hegemon –however grand that might sound even to the
stature of the United States- brings consequences. It means that America needs to maintain its
power in an anarchical international structure that is ruled by no grand authority. Survival is the
most important aim of any state, and the security of interests that serve that grand aim is what
states should do, most namely the ‘global hegemon’ or the most powerful state in the
international order.
The Chinese have been and are rising. Increased military spending, an increasing
population, a growing economy at one of the fastest paces ever by a modern state, an
increasingly influential trading partner with many parts of the world and an even bigger role in
engagements with Asian countries all are signs that China is becoming more and more of a
pursuer of regional hegemony in Northeast Asia at least, if not the whole continent. At the
same time, the United States has been in decline when it comes to its influence in the region.
The United States has been declining its military presence –albeit by relatively slim
margins, the United States has been losing top spot trading partner positions with China in
Korean and Japanese economies, and the United States has been engaged in other numerous
global issues that have taken point of its foreign policy decision making, especially in the wake
of 9/11.
The United States needed and continues to need checking China’s rise. Checking rising
powers is how great powers respond to the rise of a challenger to the most powerful nation in
the international order. The United States is bound by international pressure, but to deal with
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the challenger it needs to allocate its resources in a better way. This is in order not to risk the
rise of other new challenges to the hegemony on the global scale. With a global recession, a
global financial crisis, the American economy in recession, the US military stretched into
fighting two fields of operations since 2003, the distractions in Ukraine, the eruption of the
Arab Spring in 2010 and the destabilization of a majority of Middle Eastern countries, namely
Egypt and other allies, all meant that the US needed to re-organize its foreign policy in order to
adapt towards a refocus on China while allocating resources more efficiently.
The taking over the world’s superpower’s most important public office presents plenty
of challenges on a domestic and global scale. Of these challenges come across a pile of
inherited problems the successor takes hold of from his predecessor; Obama though is different
than any other US President.
The first black American President came across to the American public as the
Democratic candidate with an intense energy and will to change the way the US handled its
foreign affairs and better US image around the world. In addition, his domestic policies would
resonate the same theme. The Bush administration’s policies in the Middle East though were
particularly troublesome in its aftermath.
George Bush’s two ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, failed peace process,
economic downturn legacy, the legal limbo of Guantanamo and the legality debate about the
criminal pursuit and use of torture –or enhanced interrogation techniques- against terror
suspects, tensions with allies, rise of anti-American feelings in the Middle East (ME) and the
growing influence of “radical” organizations such as Hizb Allah and Iran in the region portrayed
the US as anti-Islamic and in a war against Muslims of the Middle East rather than just in the
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Middle East92. It was a sticky situation for the next President of the US to find himself pushed
into.
Barack Obama’s perception of world politics and the position that the United States
must carry on with guided him to target a solution to the Bush-created problems and an
evolution from there on, particularly to be away from the Middle East. He wanted to encourage
multilateralism rather than Bush’s unilateralism in foreign policy decision making and having a
less militarized foreign policy, accommodating other nation’s interests and concerns rather
than antagonizing them via working with them not alienating them. He campaigned on the
premise of ending the war in Iraq (the war of choice), slowing removing troops from
Afghanistan (the war of necessity) and opening a dialogue with the Muslim world to insure that
the US is not in a war against Islam, but with extremists, from all sides93. The one focus he truly
wanted was to be able to set aside his inherited problems in the Middle East to give more focus
towards America’s foreign policy on the Asia Pacific to handle the rise of China in the post-Cold
War era94.
The developments in the European stage were a sudden hindrance as well though.
Russia had become a player in the Ukrainian crisis, and the annexation of Crimea while the
United States and the EU stood watching meant that the Russian state is now a challenge to US
hegemony over the international structure in general and American influence in Europe. Playing
a role in the Syrian conflict that is more direct and official than the United States, while
enjoying diplomatic, political and economic ties with the Iranians means the Russians have
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influence over Middle Easter affairs and European ones as well. That can constitute a rise in
power and affect the international structure that the US is supposedly dominating.
The Egyptian situation was a stumbling block. Threats to the United States Middle
Eastern interests meant threat to the US’ influence in the region in particular and on the global
stage in general. The United States has committed itself since 1979 into a relationship with
Egypt that has been founded on security guarantees and the stability of US interests in terms of
securing the safe flow of cheap energy, preferential treatment of US assets in Egyptian airspace
and waterways, and establishing a safe stable relationship for Israel in the region while safely
befriending Egyptian diplomatic influence in the region in order to serve US interests. It is safe
to say that the United States needed and still needs Egypt now in light of those particular US
interests.
Continuation of US policies towards Egypt is because if the grand US interest in securing
its own global survival as the global hegemon, growing above the challenges of a rising power
like China in the international structure. Stretched resources of the United States, China rising
and growing its influence in its region while the US continues its decline in Asia and in the
world, the United States sought stability to refocus on China.
The best explanation for what is going on is that the United States is going through a
patch of being in hegemonic power decline. In their article: “Russia, Ukraine and the Testing of
American Hegemony”, Robert Murray and Luke M. Herrington discuss the decline of US
influence over the international structure by discussing its relative decline as opposed to
Chinese and Russian rise. They identify three types of decline: Relative decline is when “states
experience relative decline when they fail to compete with their neighbors, or otherwise fall
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behind in important areas of competition”95. For example, those who view China rising as an
international power, and a resurging Russia would view the US as going to fall behind in terms
of important sectors like science, technology and education to name a few. Like the fact that
Chinese government-backed scientists are on the verge of overtaking US scientists in terms of
scientific output because of the increase in quality and quantity of scientific publications each
year by the Chinese. Similar statistics are abound when it comes to education and healthcare.
Absolute decline is the utter collapse of government, like Yugoslavia. However, this is quite rare
and examples are very few.
There is however, a third type of decline which the authors suggest, the Hegemonic
Stability Theory. This is unique to hegemonic powers like the United States and is consistent
with the tenants of structural realism theories such as defensive realism. In such a theory, it is
said that world leaders can only maintain their leaderships for a limited amount of time.
Aspects of absolute and relative decline accompany this process, but this theory certainly
affects the military and economy. “Typically occurring in the leading state’s military and
economic sectors, hegemonic decline frequently results from “imperial overstretch,” and
ultimately entails a retreat from global commitments”96.
By withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, hesitancy towards Iran, the limited
operations scope of US Libya intervention which it sought to be under someone else’s control,
and the waffling on Syria’s use of chemical weapons, it’s hard to wonder that many of the
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United States’ critics have been seeing the country as abdicating policies essential to the US
influence in the Middle East and Asia. US resources have been minimized in Europe and Middle
East as a result of the end of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and we can see why American
interests are now becoming more limited.
The US grand strategy has been targeting the prevention of the rise of regional
hegemon. It can be argued that the United States “chose” to be inactive when it came to
supporting the Egyptian people in their quest for democracy in the January revolution to help
sow instability in a regional power, and that the “choice” of not acting in Syria was calculated in
order to maintain regional strife. Ultimately it may be difficult to argue against the fact that
American hegemony has been in decline for the past decade, but this decline is not absolute in
nature.
To be saying that the military and scientific capabilities of China and Russia are near
American ones is in itself a stretch. The argument is so shaky that it cannot support itself with
damming evidence97. The US still dominates the international structure, especially through its
military capabilities and technological advancements when it comes to security.
The decline in influence is real for the United States. Though the US may still have a
preponderance of power, it no longer has the ability to unilaterally deter or compel the actions
of other great powers. Recent years have demonstrated that other larger powers are testing
the proverbial waters on just how far the US will go to maintain its position in the system, and if
it perceived the US as weak or unwilling, great powers will assert themselves. Ukraine is just
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the latest example of Russia pushing the limits of American dominance. Other examples, such
as Russia’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War, Iran’s nuclear program, and Arctic aggression all
demonstrate clearly that the Russians no longer believe the US is fully capable of containing or
deterring their actions. This also sets a dangerous precedent for other emerging powers, as
questions abound regarding how China will approach Taiwan, Japan and other matters of its
regional interests.
Employing defensive realists techniques to solve Egyptian problem while trying to
counter the challenge of a China rising in power and influence with the US being the great
power that needs to address this challenge meant that the United States was interested in
decreasing aggression in the Middle East to address the international structure pressure to deal
with China. The US still is not out of the woods yet.
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